This is a rough draft of my critique of Moreland’s argument from consciousness.
J.P. Moreland is a distinguished professor of philosophy at Biola University. He is most notable for his defense of Christian theism and his rejection of naturalism as a plausible worldview. One of his most recent books, Consciousness and the Existence of God argues that finite, irreducible consciousness provides evidence for the existence of God. Throughout his book, Moreland critiques rival physicalists such as, John Searle’s “contingent correlation,” Timothy O’Connor’s “emergent necessitation,” Colin McGinn’s “mysterian naturalism,” David Skrbina’s “panpsychism,” and Philip Clayton’s “pluralistic emergentist monism.” According to Moreland, all of these positions should be rejected in favor of the “argument from consciousness” for theism. This paper will illustrate Moreland’s argument from consciousness (AC) defended in chapter two, of which I will offer a critique. Included in my critique, I will attempt to demonstrate how I think Moreland’s argument from consciousness is equally, if not more incomplete as physicalist accounts.
Prior to offering a deductive argument for the argument from consciousness (AC), Moreland states that physicalists must admit that consciousness is a brute, unexplainable fact. The main agenda of this chapter and book is to argue that naturalists should be strict physicalists and, given property dualism, there is evidence against naturalism and for theism (Moreland, 38). His discussion of naturalism leading up to his deductive argument claims that finite, mental activities may be unaccounted for by naturalism and may be best explained by theism, thereby offering evidence for God’s existence. A main challenge to naturalism is the burden of proof on the naturalist who seeks to reconcile the existent of emergent mental entities with naturalism.
Furthermore, Moreland argues that consciousness is “ontologically basic” for theism, whereas for naturalism, consciousness requires explanation. He defines distinguishes between “ontological basicality” and “pre-theoretical basicality” by defining the latter as “an entity’s nature that remains in tact and the theoretician’s aim is to explain the entity’s origin or behavior, but not reduce it” (Moreland, 29). He argues that consciousness is ontologically basic for theism because the consciousness of God accounts for this fact. However, Moreland claims that naturalism treats “consciousness as emergent, derivative, supervenient, and both its finitude and intrinsic nature require explanation (Moreland, 29).” He quotes Evan Fales who claims that Darwinian evolution implies that human beings emerged through a blind operation of natural forces. Fales continues to say, “it is mysterious how such forces could generate something non-physical. Since such processes have produced consciousness, however construed, consciousness is evidently a natural phenomenon, and dependent on natural phenomena.”
Moreland claims that this reasoning is ad hoc and question begging given theism and AC, since Fales acknowledges unnaturalness of consciousness within naturalist ontology. Moreover, Moreland believes this is a category mistake to link non-physical phenomena with physical processes alone. A central objection to naturalism in this book appears in chapter two when Moreland states that naturalism embraces “ontological simplicity and epistemic preference for the third-person account, which places pressure on the naturalist to be a strong physicalist” (Moreland, 31); whereas for theists, they do not have this pressure because consciousness need not be reduced with the explanation from AC or theism.
For instance, according to Moreland’s AC, theistic metaphysics does account for consciousness by imposing the unembodied mind of God and asserts that it isn’t surprising that finite consciousness exists. Moreland claims that on a naturalist account, mental states “are out of place” or a category mistake and thus, consciousness must be a brute fact for the naturalist. Moreland holds the view that mental states are describable from a first person view, but not from a third person point of view. For example, a scientist can explain what it might be like for a lion to chase down its prey, but the scientist would never know what it is like to be this hunting lion. For more on this topic, see Thomas Nagel’s compelling argument of how a third-person account cannot explain a first-person experience in “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?”
One of Moreland’s central claims asserts that naturalists should be strong physicalists in order to avoid inconsistency, category mistakes, and question begging. Even naturalist, David Papineau claims that physicalists should deny that there are two properties, the physical and non-physical in answer to the question of why consciousness emerges from some physical systems and not others. For example, why is it the case that humans possess consciousness, but microbes do not? Since physicalism cannot account for consciousness or the first-person experience of the world, some physicalists and Moreland claim that all naturalists need to reject dualism and instead, hold to a strong physicalist view to escape this dilemma. For, if the physicalist admits to the existence of non-physical entities, they open the door to the possibility of theistic accounts and become trapped in question-begging, category mistakes.
In addition to Moreland’s argument from consciousness (AC), theists, Richard Swinburn, Angus Menuge, and Robert Adams offer similar versions as well. However, I will focus on the deductive argument espoused by Moreland. Here is his argument as follows:
1) “Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.
2) Specific mental event types are regularly correlated with specific physical event types.
3) There is an explanation for these correlations.
4) Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.
5) The explanation for these correlations is either a personal or natural scientific explanation.
6) The explanation is not a natural scientific one.
7) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
8) If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.
9) Therefore, the explanation is theistic” (Moreland, 37).
In chapter two Moreland does not completely defend premises (3) and (6) because he spends the rest of the book explaining these points. However, my critique will cover premises (1), (2), and (4), and will touch upon one point he makes about premise (3). The critique of these premises should be sufficient to demonstrate that Moreland is equally incomplete as the physicalists in an account of consciousness.
Regarding premise (1), he admits that the truth of premise one is an assumption and then immediately claims that property dualism yields evidence against naturalism and for theism. Property dualists argue that mental states are not physical since they possess the following six features that characterize mental states, but not physical states as follows:
a) “There is a raw qualitative feel or ‘what it is like’ to a mental state such as pain.
b) At least many mental states have intentionality—oftness or aboutness—directed towards an object.
c) Mental states exhibit certain epistemic features (direct access, private access, first-person epistemic authority, are expressed in intentional contexts, self-reflexivity associated with “I”) that could not be the case if they were physical.
d) They require a subjective ontology—namely, mental states are necessarily owned by the first-person, unified, sentient subjects who have them.
e) Mental states fail to have crucial features (e.g. spatial extension, location) that characterize physical states and, in general, cannot be described using physical language.
f) Libertarian free acts exemplify active power and not passive liability” (Moreland, 38).
Moreland spends several pages backing up premise (a) with the knowledge argument, which attacks the physicalist’s claim that physical explanations completely account for mental states. The famous example proponents of the knowledge argument point to is the fact that Mary may know everything about the science of color perception, but the question is whether she can know what the experience of red is like if she has never seen red. If the answer is “yes,” then Mary has learned something new and thus, physicalism fails to account for this newly acquired knowledge. After asserting this knowledge argument, Moreland moves into a discussion of premise (4), which states that, “personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.”
His main justification for this premise rests upon the difference between personal and event causal theory of agency. Event causal theory essentially argues that actions are events caused by combinations of intentional attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and most significantly, it holds that in order to cause behavior, intentional attitudes must be neural events that physicalism can fully explain. Moreland points to naturalist philosopher J.L. Mackie who rejects premise (4) because he labels personal explanation as “a sub-class of event causal theory.” J.L. Mackie contends that human action involves “efficient event causality” between prior mental states that depend completely on physical states, and thus, there is no need to insert a theistic explanation. Any discussion of divine agency or analogy between divine action and personal explanation is a disanalogy because this connection is completely mysterious and unaccounted for.
As a response to common objections that Mackie points to, Moreland proposes that personal explanation of mental states is superior to event causal because according to premises (2) and (3) of AC, the causal theory will not account for the “origin, regularity, and precise nature of these correlations, since these are what constitute a causal theory of action in the first place. If a causal theory of action presupposes mental states, then it will be important to explain the existence, regularity, and precise nature of those mental states unless a divine causal agency of action is used” (Moreland, 47). Given reasons for personal explanation, Moreland sees no good reason why a theist cannot use divine causal theory to account for the nature of mental states.
To further establish his case that theism should be a viable option to explain consciousness, Moreland points to Thomas Nagel’s argument that natural scientific explanation of consciousness is inadequate and criticizes him for not considering theism as a plausible explanation of the mental. Moreland believes that, “Nagel expresses a view about freedom and personal explanation according to which libertarian freedom is what we take ourselves to have, yet we cannot have it, given naturalism and the external, third-person scientific point of view” (Moreland, 49). If naturalism is true, then everything is determined according to physical laws of nature.
Furthermore, Moreland believes that Nagel would accept premises (1) through (4) and as a result, thinks these premises are sufficient for deeming scientific naturalism as false. Many object by saying that theism cannot give any understanding of consciousness, but Moreland says this is based on the assumption that an explanation must point to a mechanism before it offers an adequate explanation (Moreland, 49). Instead, Moreland believes that a personal explanation need not offer a mechanism, but instead, account for personal explanation by describing the “relevant person, his intentions, the basic power exercised, and offer a description of the action plan” (Moreland, 50). Thus, he believes that if we have a model for who God is and His intentions for creating the world, one should be able to reference God in regards to mental states because a non-physical agent best explains non-physical mental states.
Critique of Moreland’s Argument from Consciousness
Premise (1) states, “mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.” To justify this premise, Moreland admits this is an assumption and highlights property dualism to support the case that mental states are not physical states. Property dualism claims that the physical is the only substance and it denies the existence of immaterial minds that somehow interact with the physical world. Property dualism does not reduce mental states to physical states because mental states are irreducible. Although there is only one type of substance: physical, there are two types of property: physical and non-physical. Bodies have physical properties such weight and height, and mental properties such as beliefs and desires. Moreland points to property dualism to support his first premise that mental states are non-physical entities, but ignores the fact that property dualists believe that the mental relies on the physical for its existence. For, the physical is the only substance that contains two types of property.
While mental events may not be equivalent to physical events, this is still undetermined. While Moreland is accusing strong physicalists of begging the question and espousing consciousness as a brute fact, I believe he is equally as guilty of begging the question. In attempt to completely separate the physical with the non-physical with premise (1), Moreland is ignoring the fact that we have yet to account for mind without physical embodiment. At the conclusion of chapter two, Moreland states, “perhaps our conclusion that a naturalist ought to be a strong physicalist is premature. Maybe there are adequate naturalist accounts of the mental” (Moreland, 51). This is inconsistent with his first premise and its justification because to admit that maybe the physical can account for consciousness, while at the same time, claiming that physicalism is false is misleading.
While I agree that the first-person account is currently unexplained by physicalist accounts, this does not mean that there is a “genuine” difference between physical and mental states. Just because a physicalist account of first person experience and intentionality is not complete does not mean that theism or Berkeley’s idealism should be the case. It is especially untenable to claim that just because strong physicalism may be false does not mean that property dualism is false. In fact, I do not think strong physicalism should be abandoned because science may solve this quandary in the future.
I am not opposed to one working towards accounting for consciousness with theism or Berkeley’s idealism, however, it is unclear how this could be established because the theistic proposal does not yield any new information about how consciousness arose from a theistic entity. The AC runs into the same dogmatic assertion that the strong physicalists encounter because both strict physicalism and theism are incomplete or unable to account for consciousness. However, I would argue that theism is even more incomplete than strong physicalism because no observable or testable evidence for the existence of a non-physical, personal agent who is responsible for consciousness exists. Theists encounter the same problem as strict physicalists by also begging the question with the explanation of how the immaterial interacts and/or causes the material.
In support of premise (2), Moreland claims that physicalist’s typically endorse the causal theory, however, he argues that physicalists cannot account for the “origin, regularity, and precise nature of these correlations, since these are what constitute a causal theory of action in the first place. If an event causal theory of action presupposes mental states, then it will be important to explain the existence, regularity, and precise nature of those mental states unless a divine causal agency of action is used” (Moreland, 47). While I agree with Thomas Nagel that physicalism is incomplete in that it needs to account for the existence and nature of mental states, this does not mean that a theistic explanation automatically wins favor over physicalism or even qualifies as a plausible explanation.
I believe Nagel is correct in not positing alternatives, but instead merely states that reductive physicalism is incomplete. When one posits theism or panpsychist theories, this presents an argument from ignorance and god of the gaps fallacy. In fact, I think premise (2) provides more support for physicalism than theism because if some or even many mental states can be traced to particular physical states, then this provides more explanatory power than theism. Theism begs more questions and lacks empirical verification. While I realize that just because something cannot be empirically verified does not mean it is true or false, however, I think conclusions strengthen when they merit empirical verification.
Moreland points to Thomas Nagel’s argument that natural scientific explanation of consciousness is inadequate and criticizes him for not considering theism as a plausible explanation of the mental. Moreland believes that, “Nagel expresses a view about freedom and personal explanation according to which libertarian freedom is what we take ourselves to have, yet we cannot have it, given naturalism and the external, third-person scientific point of view” (Moreland, 49). My objection to Moreland here points to the question of how one knows that humans possess libertarian freedom given theism. Even within Christian theology, some strands of Calvinism claim that God determines who is “saved” and determines every event that occurs in the world. The argument fails to establish how libertarian freedom follows from theism or a personal agent. For all we know, a super-brain or Berkeley’s idealist mind could completely determine events in the world. Furthermore, just because “we take ourselves to have libertarian freedom” in no way indicates that we actually possess freedom.
How do we know that humanity cannot have any freedom if naturalism is true? Certainly, we know aspects of life are determined such as, what family we are born into, our genetic makeup, what gender we are, ect…however, whether all events in human life are determined, partially-determined, or not determined is beyond knowledge. If naturalism is true, this does not automatically mean that all natural events are determined. This is not the most troubling claim Moreland makes. The most puzzling claim he make is that a “personal explanation need not offer a mechanism, but instead, accounts for personal explanation by describing the relevant person, his intentions, the basic power exercised, and offer a description of the action plan” (Moreland, 50). Just because a non-physical, supernatural agent possesses the same ontology as a non-physical mental state does not mean this is the best explanation or even a plausible explanation. However, if evidence existed to the fact that a disembodied consciousness existed, then this would provide some evidence for one to use inference to the best explanation.
Those who rely on these types of methods often arrive at contradictory conclusions about the nature of the supernatural. So if the supernatural world or personal agent exists, it does not appear that science or any kind of inquiry has yet to discover reliable means for acknowledging it. While incomplete, physicalism at least offers more explanatory power via empirical observation (i.e. brain scanning) in regards to the existence of mental states such as pain, emption, and thought. Whereas theism or any kind of supernatural explanation begs the question and argues from ignorance in the same way as strong physicalists when they assert certainty that consciousness warrants a purely physicalist response. The most honest approach is to admit the incompleteness of physicalism and continue to search for answers, which both theism and strong physicalism fail to provide.