Review of Licona’s Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach
Michael Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, a New Historiographical Approach, 2010, 718 pp., $26.13, ISBN: 0830827196
Michael Licona’s The Resurrection of Jesus, a New Historiographical Approach is a comprehensive collection of information that tailors to the evangelical understanding of Jesus’ resurrection. This accessible and scholarly book is a must read for those with interests in historical Jesus studies. Whether one agrees with Licona’s conclusions or not, his book is worth reading for a solid overview of historical methods and the historical Jesus from a various positions. His fair treatment of competing views provides for an informative tour through the predominant views surrounding the historical Jesus. The “new historiographical approach” is supposed to fill a void in historical Jesus research with a “carefully defined and extensive historical method” (Licona, 20). Although not entirely new, Licona’s historiographical approach presents an extensive collection of historical methods, a discussion of bias or personal “horizon”, offers suggestions for assuaging biases, and offers a case that Jesus rose from the dead. This case includes textual evidence, extra-biblical evidence, an epistemology that encompasses coherence theory, and inference to the best explanation (hereafter IBE). Given the lengthy, but deep engagement with textual interpretation, many in-house debates could ensue, such as a current debate over the historical significance of Matthew 27. However, my review will focus on key arguments supporting the resurrection hypothesis (RH) from the historical bedrock, and ultimately conclude that RH does not succeed as the best explanation.
In outline, Chapter 1 presents various approaches to historical inquiry and the challenges that face accurate interpretation of the data. Chapter 2 offers a defense of miracles and addresses multiple views of miracles from Hume, C. Behan McCullagh, John Meier, and Bart Ehrman. Chapter 3 ranks the reliability of Biblical and extra-Biblical sources pertaining to the death and resurrection of Jesus. Chapter 4 aims to establish the “historical bedrock” or facts that hold the most agreement of Jesus and his resurrection. Chapter 5 evaluates five resurrection hypothesis: Vermes’s hypothesis, Goulder’s hypothesis, Lüdemann hypothesis, Crossan’s hypothesis, Craffert’s hypothesis, and Licona’s view, the resurrection hypothesis.
Chapter 1: Important Considerations on Historical Inquiry Pertaining to the Truth in Ancient Texts.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of historical methods outside of biblical studies, the challenges that face one’s historical research (e.g. one’s ”horizon”), and discusses the philosophy of history. Amidst this discussion, Licona reveals his agenda and methodology, which as he proclaims, “was conducted more in the interest of confirming my faith and for use in apologetic presentations than being an open investigation in which I would follow the evidence where it led me” (Licona, 131). His historical method utilizes inference to the best explanation (IBE) over statistical inference since the resurrection and miracle events represent one-time events, which do not comply with the method of statistical inference. Given chosen historical method and personal biases, this chapter highlights a crucial point that personal agendas, biases, and hopes for certain outcomes jeopardizes the truth that one ultimately seeks or at least purports to seek.
In order to alleviate bias, Licona offers several helpful suggestions: 1) Historians should use a method to foster greater objectivity. 2) Historians need to publically state their horizon or biases. 3) Have an awareness of his or her peer group pressure. 4) Submit arguments or ideas to scholars who do not agree with your view and engage with criticism. 5) Begin historical research with investigation of the historical facts that historical scholars endorse. These facts represent an event’s “historical bedrock” that Historical hypotheses should account for in order to remain in the running as a reliable fact. 6) Detach from personal bias as much as possible (Licona, 50-60). These points apply to many areas beyond history and will prove useful in almost any quest for truth.
Chapter 2: The Historian and Miracles
This chapter begins with a critique of a Humean view of miracles. Before analyzing his reasons, it is worth noting that even if one’s critique of Hume’s view of miracles succeeds, this does nothing to help the case for Jesus’ resurrection since a non-Humean approach can equally discredit miraculous events. This is because one may use IBE, criteria from legal testimony, and criteria for credible eyewitness testimony to arrive at a low probability assessment, if not a complete rejection of Jesus’ resurrection as a plausible scenario.
To address Hume’s view of miracles, Licona highlights Hume’s view of testimony, which indicates that an event:
“Must be attested by sufficient number of witnesses of ‘unquestioned good sense, education, and learning,’ and of such ‘undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion’ of deceit. Moreover, these witnesses are to be of such a high reputation in the eyes of others, that they would have much to lose if lying. The event must be performed publicly in a major part of the world so that its visibility would be unavoidable” (Licona, 138).
In response to this, Licona claims that, “if Hume’s criteria for accepting testimony as true were employed outside of miracle-claims, we would probably have to dismiss the vast majority of what we believe we presently know about the past” (Licona, 138-139). Without providing examples to support this claim, the paragraph ends with a curt comment that historians still offer historical judgments even if they do not meet Hume’s criteria with the use of “criteria for authenticity and arguments to the best explanation.” While this last part is true, the problem for the bold claim about dismissing vast amounts of history points to the fact that widely accepted, historical events and figures in history do not include miracle claims. In fact, most all of events in history survive Hume’s criteria about reliable testimony quite well. Licona first needs to provide evidence for his statement in order to motivate his claim, which is supposed to weaken Hume’s criteria.
Licona’s second criticism refers to Hume’s concern with intelligence and integrity of witnesses. If evidence for a miracle is credible and no plausible natural explanation exists, to reject it based on the fact that many other miracle claims exist among the uneducated and ignorant is guilty of the ad hominem fallacy (Licona, 139). While he is correct with this assertion, Hume’s point, which should have different wording, is a good one; that the problem for miracles does not rest in the characteristics of ancient cultures (e.g. ignorance and gullibility). Rather, it rests with the fact that certain cultures made miracle claims that abundant naturalistic explanations account for over time. While this well evidenced claim is not enough to completely reject miracle claims as potentially true, since a unique event with minimal evidence may be true, it does give good reason for caution in assigning miracle status to an event.
Licona’s third criticism of Hume surrounds his principle of analogy. I agree that Hume’s principle cannot single-handedly eliminate the possibility of miracles (i.e. miracles do not exist in the present, so they do not exist in the past). However, the principle of analogy does provide compelling evidence that, when combined with the following: IBE, legal testimony, and eyewitness criteria, it adds to a cumulative case for or against a particular miracle claim. The complaint that the principle of analogy would eliminate the existence of dinosaurs is incorrect because compelling evidence supports the life and extinction of dinosaurs. While I understand the problem with trying to use the principle of analogy alone to reject miracles (e.g. ‘x’ does not currently happen, ergo, it never happened in the past), the example that Licona uses to make this point fails due to overwhelming evidence that shows the inapplicability of the analogy principle to dinosaurs. Since overwhelming evidence shows the inapplicability of the analogy principle to dinosaurs, another example needs to apply. Hume’s point is a good one, that if there is no familiarity with something now and no evidence to support that it occurs now or anytime in history, a high level of skepticism in support of the item in question is warranted.
Towards the end of chapter two, Licona asserts his definition of a miracle “as an event in history for which natural explanations are inadequate. I am contending that we may identify a miracle when the event is (1) is extremely unlikely to have occurred given the circumstances and/or natural law and (2) occurs in an environment or context charged with religious significance” (Licona, 171). If these criterion find fulfillment in the resurrection hypothesis (RH), and RH is the best explanation of the historical bedrock, then the historian may warrant that a miracle occurred.
I find this miracle criterion problematic due to the fact that point (1) assumes that criteria exists to discern a supernatural event and relies on a plea from ignorance. Simply because an event appears mysterious or unlikely, and one cannot provide a natural explanation does not automatically rule out natural explanations. If one wants to establish a supernatural explanation, then one must give criteria for determining such an explanation that moves beyond the mystery factor. What this would be, I think theists have yet to produce (1). Point (2) is even more problematic because a highly charged religious climate does nothing to support a miraculous event. The only viable criteria that Licona offers here is IBE and how well the evidence explains the historical bedrock.
Interestingly, the principle of analogy does align miracles in the bible with various legends that no one accepts as historical very well. It also provides solid reason to hold much caution in affirming miracle events. Thus, when the principle of analogy combines with IBE, eyewitness testimony, and legal case criteria, it provides significant insight into a case for or against a historical claim. With this in mind, lets move forward to assess the comprehensive evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.
Chapter 3: Historical Sources Pertaining to the Resurrection of Jesus
This chapter opens with a discussion of Canonical Gospels genre (i.e. mythology and biography), gospel dating, dependency between the books, the Q source, oral formulas (i.e. oral traditions in worship or baptismal settings may have come from an earlier source, so they are earlier than they appear in the New Testament), and non-Christian sources mentioning Jesus. Licona also discusses the debate over Paul’s interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection as bodily or spiritual. He rates the following documents that “possibly” reflect oral sources prior to the Gospels: Josephus, Tacitus, Thallus (barely), Clement of Rome (possible-plus), and Barnabus (possible-minus). The rest (canonical Gospels, Clement of Rome, Rabbinic sources, Celsus, Mara bar Serapion, Suetonius, Pliny the Younger, Thallus, Tacitus, Polycarp, the Acts speeches, and the Gospel of Thomas), are under the “unlikely” category.
The central claim of this chapter asserts that oral traditions exist throughout the New Testament and provide the best evidence that supports the reliability of apostolic teaching of Jesus’ ministry and resurrection. The fact that Paul and perhaps other Jerusalem apostles, Peter, James, and John, mentioned in the kerygma, provide multiple accounts of Jesus’ ministry and resurrection (Licona, 275). Dunn’s criteria provides some support highlighting influence from the Jerusalem Church given the grammar, parallelism, an untypical term for Paul to use, and word order in Romans 1:3b-4a. The only exception is the “primitive description of Christ’s resurrection as ‘the resurrection of the dead’” because the verse does not read the same as the primitive description. ‘The resurrection of the dead” yields a different meaning than the primitive description; “of the dead,” a general phrase is different from the particular phrase, “his resurrection from the dead.” Despite this, I find the evidence presented in this chapter quite compelling that apostolic influence permeates Paul’s writings.
As for Paul’s conversion story, it is worth using caution towards its reliability since, according to Licona, “we have no material written by Paul (Saul) during his pre-Christian life, no written material by Jewish leaders during the time of Paul’s ministry describing his conversion, no documents from the Roman or Jewish governing bodies that mention the Christian sect, nothing about apostolic preaching, and no reports that Jesus rose from the dead” (Licona, 275). Despite this, if the facts of Paul’s life are well supported and reliable, which remains debatable, this chapter offers strong ties between Paul and apostolic teaching.
Chapters 4 & 5: The Historical Bedrock Pertaining to the Fate of Jesus
Chapter four presents evidence that identifies widely accepted facts about Jesus as a miracle worker, as an eschatological agent, His predictions of His death and Resurrection, the bedrock that applies to Jesus’ fate, appearances to the Disciples, the conversion of Paul, Paul’s beliefs about the resurrection of Jesus, the conversion of James, and the empty tomb. The chapter ends with the following bedrock: 1) Jesus died by crucifixion. 2) Shortly after Jesus’ death, the disciples had experiences that led them to believe that Jesus appeared to them. 3) Several years after Jesus’ death, Paul converted to Christianity after a post-resurrection appearance of Jesus to him and taught about the resurrection of the body (Licona, 463).
Chapter five, my favorite chapter, offers an impressive analysis of six resurrection hypotheses. Licona’s fair presentation of each view includes an analysis of how each one fares IBE criterion. This chapter highlights worthy concerns for each view outside of RH, such as a naturalistic bias and assertions that assume too much (e.g. reason requires naturalistic explanations over supernatural explanations). However, even granting all of the proposed historical bedrock of Jesus death and resurrection, I do not think he has made a convincing case that RH stands out as the best explanations above all others.
First, the assertion that RH “explains all of our bedrock without any strain whatsoever” is a hasty induction (Licona, 600). Basing RH’s explanatory power above all other possible explanations based on the historical bedrock leaves a gap between how humans can know or identify a supernatural event. Licona’s criterion for a miracle contains the assertion that “the event occurs in a context charged with religious significance” (Licona, 468). But this seems to work against reliable identification of a miracle in the sense that religiously charged contexts may cloud the individual’s interpretation of an event more than contexts with little religious, emotional influence.
Second, Licona does not allow for hallucination or mistaken visions, which are well documented in neuroscience research (2). In fact, an individual under distressing situations can experience a one-time hallucination. It is difficult to see how one could rule out the possibility that Paul experienced a hallucination. Certainly, this does not automatically eradicate the possibility of a supernatural event such as, Jesus’ post-resurrection appearance. What this evidence does do is leave options open in a way that does not help RH’s claim as the best explanation of the historical bedrock.
Third, Licona admits that establishing the plausibility of RH is difficult because it requires a supernatural explanation (Licona, 601). This highlights a significant problem for reaching best explanations for supernatural or miracle events if a reliable criterion does not exist for such assertions. So far, we have personal testimony without evidence beyond personal experiences in a religiously charged context. But this seems to leave much room for speculation and does not establish the case for RH one way or the other. Reasons why will unravel in more detail in the next two points.
Fourth, without presupposing anything about God, one can take a “position of openness”, as Licona suggests, and arrive at the conclusion that reasoning from the ground up does not help establish RH as the best explanation. One need not presuppose naturalism, agnosticism, or even supernaturalism to realize that RH fails IBE criterion two, three, and four (especially the fourth). Operating from a position of openness reveals that invoking a miracle event or supernatural intervention is the least parsimonious and most ad hoc from all other explanations. The reason is not due to a presupposition of naturalism, but rather, it means the existence of a reliable method or criterion for identifying supernatural events remains a mystery. To base a miracle event on claims to ignorance, personal experiences, and the consideration of whether an event makes sense in a “religiously charged context” does not account for a supernatural explanation. However, it does explain the existence of certain facts. The case for supernaturalism needs to bridge the gap between how one jumps from certain facts to a supernatural event.
Fifth, even if I presuppose a personal, omni-competent God, this leads to undesirable implications for RH’s case under IBE. The underwhelming historical bedrock is evidence enough that God is probably not interested in revealing His message to the world. If eternal destinies remain at stake, I do not think it is unreasonable to expect overwhelming appearances of the resurrected Jesus as opposed to a select few. While I agree that simply because we do not have more desirable evidence, that RH does not fail as a plausible explanation. However, it does present a challenge to establish RH as the best explanation.
To assert that a naturalistic explanation fares better than a supernatural explanation does not automatically mean that someone necessarily presupposes naturalism or remains captive to personal bias. While biases remain a challenge to anyone seeking truth, I do think that if one utilizes Licona’s suggestions for resisting bias, then it is impossible to arrive at conclusions from a perspective of openness. Given the lack of a good theistic or supernatural explanation, this points to the fact that more work must occur to establish one. While supernatural events may very well occur, however, it is best to refrain from supernatural conclusions until a reliable account surfaces (3).
Even if those in favor of supernaturalism and RH claim that they need not produce an accurate account that identifies supernatural events, that testimony and IBE is all they need, problems remain; that is, multiple explanations for visions, conversions, and an empty tomb (this does not reside in the historical bedrock), remain available in a way that does not allow supernatural events to win out above all other explanations. Those in favor of RH could claim that these comments reflect a presupposition of naturalism. However, an analysis from the openness position could conclude that it remains a mystery as to how one accounts for supernatural or miraculous explanations; that is, without committing an argument from ignorance and committing a hasty inference.
(1) See Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation for an excellent analysis of explanatory power and theistic or supernatural explanations.
(2)http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2702442/; http://www.acnr.co.uk/pdfs/volume4issue2/v4i2reviewart3.pdf.
(3) On this topic, see Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation and Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles.
I am so glad you read this book, and that you took the time to respond here. So, here are my initial comments.
You stated the value of chapter one well. Licona does a nice job at laying out criteria for historical inquiry that certainly should extend beyond that field!
Regarding chapter two, you made the counter-argument that one of Hume’s arguments against miracle claims actually has to do with the fact that ancient miracle claims just needed time and scientific advancement to be explained naturally. However, I don’t think that being a skeptic about miracle claims in general entails doubting all particular miracle claims equally. That is, if we assert that we live in a closed system, fine; no miracles can possible occur in such a system, so let’s discuss that first. But if we agree at least on a theoretically—possibly, if not probably— open system of supernatural cause and effect, then the possibility of miracles remains regardless of the level of credibility possessed by certain particular miracle claims. You acknowledge the failure of Hume’s view to deem miracle claims impossible. In a world with at least possible miracles, then, I reassert that the issue becomes now not the probability of miracles occurring in a general sense, but rather how likely was each miracle taken on a case-by-case basis.
Regarding your counter-criticism of Hume’s principle of analogy, here is a counterexample (to your criticism) for consideration: Since wars are not presently fought with trebuchets, wars were never fought with trebuchets. If such a principle holds, it would reduce historical knowledge to only the sliver of history which looks like the present. Besides being counter-intuitive, it is entirely arbitrary. I think that Licona’s criticism holds, because the purpose is to show that if this is a principle at all, it is a universal principle, and as such, it does away with loads of known facts. I don’t see how the extinction proviso fits into such a principle.
Back to my suggested case-by-case basis of evaluating miracles, you claim, “Simply because an event appears mysterious or unlikely, and one cannot provide a natural explanation does not automatically rule out natural explanations.” This may be true, but again, we are dealing with a resurrection claim from a death at the hands of Roman excecutioners. Every possible natural explanation for this event is already on the table, and has been on the table for years. This is not an event with a future explanation pending more medical knowledge. The historical bedrock appeal remains strong for this case, which moves us into the section on chapters 4 and 5.
In your critique of chapter 5, you argue that the IBE of the historical bedrock is inadequate in part because “religiously charged contexts may cloud the individual’s interpretation of an event more than contexts with little religious, emotional influence.” Agreed. However, in this situation, the context was religiously charged against the outcome of an immediate resurrection. (1) the Messiah was supposed to conquer and reign—not die—according to popular (although mistaken) Jewish theology. (2) All notions of resurrection that existed at that time were of the general resurrection at the end of time. So, it is remarkably unlikely, even impossible, that the religious context of the day would on its own persuade Jewish multitudes to embrace the idea of a suffering, dying, and resurrected Messiah.
Further, you complain that Licona does not account for the possibility of hallucination by Paul and others. This is fair; perhaps he should have thoroughly addressed the matter. However, while hallucinations are known to occur, there is absolutely no precedent for masses hallucinating the same thing, and it is still more unlikely for a large group of hundreds to hallucinate the same thing at the same time. And if the theory is indeed incorrect that Christianity moved from unity to diversity over time, not the other way around, then these supposed hallucination reports were remarkably consistent with each other and produced a surprisingly homozygous religion quite early (possibly prior to the 40s AD, if research about the Philippians Christ hymn is correct).
Lastly, even while admitting the theoretical possibility of miracles, you seem to operate from a standpoint which renders impossible the gathering of evidence for evaluation of any particular miracle claim. As best I can tell, the basic formulation of your standpoint seems to be this:
Miracles require evidence. The only evidence that is acceptable is the evidence of a natural explanation. Any natural explanation removes the possibility of a miracle having occurred.
So, even if we say that we are operating from a position of openness, this method tightly closes its eyes and declares any evidence for a miracle non-existent due to an arbitrarily (and conveniently) restrictive definition of evidence. This is methodological naturalism at its worst.
Looking forward to your thoughts.
Hi SG,
Thanks for your input! Here are my thoughts on your points:
1) You mention that an open system permits the possibility of miracles, and imply that a closed system does not. Whether the universe is closed, open, flat, spherical, or hyperbolic, the one positing a miracle remains in the same position. That is, a miracle event remains unaccounted for. To rescue miracle account, one needs to explain what counts as a miracle event beyond mere absence of naturalistic explanation and/or mystical experiences. Why? Because far too often, individuals throughout history believed in a miracle event that a naturalistic explanation accounted for at a later time. This point shows that a better account of miracles stands in need. We can analyze case-by-case, but if we do not have a good account of what counts as a miracle, I’m afraid that we are not in a good position to judge cases at this point.
2) I am in agreement with your counter-example, that “since wars are not presently fought with trebuchets, wars were never fought with trebuchets” would not be a good analogy. My point was that Licona’s dinosaur example fails to capture the issue he has with with Hume’s principle of analogy. Given his dinosaur example, the principle of analogy does not apply since compelling evidence supports the existence and extinction of dinosaurs, so I do not think the principle of analogy can apply to the existence of dinosaurs. Licona needs another example. As for Hume’s analogy principle, I do not interpret it to argue that simply because ‘x’ does not currently happen, therefore it never happened in the past. If this were true, Hume would face an overwhelming amount of counterexamples to events and tools used in history that no longer exist during his own time. It appears that the analogy principle takes aim at situations in which something in question does not appear to occur now and there is no or very weak evidence that supports it in history. Under these circumstances, Hume’s principle of analogy makes a good point; one should compare items in question with occurrences now and in the past to assess its viability. If there is very little to no support, then one should hold the item in question in suspense until further evidence either helps or hinders its case.
3) While I agree with you that the religious context of the day is against the idea of a resurrection to Jewish circles, I think it is worth noting that a growing amount of people began to believe in and promote the idea of a resurrection and the afterlife both during Jesus’ life, death, and supposed resurrection. New and developing religions often involve a high level of zeal, passion, and more often than not, begin from an uncritical, highly intuitive stance. While this does not mean that zealous, intuitive, uncritical approaches are never true, it does mean that such approaches do not help making a case for something based on reason.
4) As for hallucinations, I agree that it is unlikely for hundreds to hallucinate the same thing. But there were not hundreds who provided a testimony, rather, it was a select few. In fact, there are many cases in which people believe they interact with a loved one who passed away, especially if it is very recent. It is difficult to defend the resurrection of Jesus based on a few individuals with a heavy personal investment in Jesus’ earthly mission. Now, I do think that Paul (and James, even though Licona doesn’t include him in the bedrock) provides a stronger account of Jesus’ resurrection than Jesus’ devoted followers. But I also take into account many examples of enemies of ‘x’ at a particular time later accept ‘x’. Individuals change their minds and have religious experiences that identify with various religious traditions. To claim that testimony for Jesus’ resurrection is good, testimony directly from hundreds would provide major support. Even better, testimony would provide an excellent account if thousands of people from outside of Jesus’ life, death, and supposed resurrection witnessed the resurrected Jesus. Is it unreasonable to expect that an omni-benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent God could reveal the resurrected Jesus to people outside of Jesus’ immediate earthly location? I find it suspect that this did not occur.
5) I am open to non-natural miracle event, but I am not sure what a good non-natural explanation of a miracle would look like, so I continue to think about this issue.
Correction: In my fifth paragraph from the bottom, where it says “And if the theory is indeed incorrect that Christianity moved from unity to diversity over time, not the other way around, then these supposed hallucination reports were remarkably…” It should say “if the theory is indeed CORRECT…” Huge difference in meaning there!
I have not read the book yet, although I plan to. Up front I have to admit that I am a Christian, but I remain agnostic to the ability to detect miracles using natural endeavors, including historical studies. I do question at least one thing you stated above though, and that is “In fact, most all of events in history survive Hume’s criteria about reliable testimony quite well.” This I would say is just as equally off the cuff as Licona’s remark that you are refuting. What causes you to suggest this?
I think there are several problems with what Licona is saying. He is doing the typical maximal conservative nonsense of slanting his work towards traditional evangelical positions. That being said the issue is that he is debating with the wrong person’s and in the wrong way. It is not science to try to prove your ideas but to try to falsify them. The issue is not whether miracles can happen either. No one has a camera over the entire universe proving miracles never ever happen but the issue is rather whether we know they happen. We do not know that miracles happen but they are implausible. Even most modern protestants dont believe miracles happen anymore. They will argue against other protestants and catholics as having plausible miracle claims. So here is the principle of analogy given to you by christians. Collingwood said that history is imagining scenarios of the past and by using the criteria of modern christians we can imagine that the resurrection did not happen. If we compare the salem witch trials with its massive amount of evidence according to the contemporary christians for black magic and the modern understanding among most christians that this is not magic then you see the problem with the NT even if we were to concede that it is historical evidence for a miracle which I do not. If you are a modern christain who believes the supernatural is going on in the church then you need to verify these claims as I tried to. I was pentecostal and there is not reason to believe any of these stories. I would rather you go in believing them any way so you can be dragged kicking and screaming to the truth by science and never again accuse non believers of having some hidden agenda i.e. of willful unbelief or the love of some secret sin. Moreover that issue is not even on the radar once you consider that Licona is confusing genre’s. The gospels are narrative fictions as is the book of acts. That is a point in demonstrating that all the epistles are pseudonymous with various layers to them. Whoever wrote the core pauline epistles was a gnostic. The need of an earthly jesus to explain Christian orgins is just not there. To his credit Licona has realized that the end of matthew is not history. I hope he is consistent and applies this criteria to the rest of the gospels. I wish him the best.
Apparently Licona’s book has caused something of a furor in the Evangelical world, all on the basis of one brief passage. I came upon an article about it at the Christianity Today website which you can see here:
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2011/november/interpretation-sparks-theology-debate.html
Hi Steve,
Thanks for the link. I read about this here: http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2011/11/christian-nt-scholar-and-apologist.html.
“I can’t help but be struck by the fact that apparently many Christian scholars were unwilling to publicly defend Licona, presumably because they were afraid they might lose their jobs, too. It is precisely because of this sort of mentality that I have previously questioned whether evangelical Christians can consistently affirm the ethics of belief required by freethought.”
Hey Sarah!
Upon re-reading your article I noticed that you had mentioned the controversy surrounding Licona’s commentary on Matthew 27. I missed that in my intial reading.
I’ve got to admit that I am pretty amazed that Licona, evidently, was forced out of his office with NAMB as well as losing his employment at the Southern Evangelical Seminary all on the basis of one trivial deviation from inerrantist orthodoxy in a 718 page apologetic work. Wow! It boggles my little mind! Conditions are much worse in the world Evangelical academia than I could have imagined. I was pleased to see that Dr. Blomberg, of your Alma Mater, appropriately described this debacle as a “witch hunt” and only hope that Blomberg has more security in his employment that Licona did. I am about to read through the comments to the Christianity Today article. In the past I have been pleasantly surprised by the progressive attitudes displayed by many rank and file Evangelicals in response to displays of regressive authoritarianism commonly associated with Evangelicalsim.
Anyhow, I continue to follow your blog and hope all is well with you. If you don’t mind me asking, how would you describe your current position on religion and Christianity? I know, not easy questions to answer briefly. Still, if you are inclined to give it a go, it would appease my curiosity.
Peace
Steve
Hi Steve,
Thanks for reading my blog and commenting. My view of Christianity, as with all other religions, is that they represent interpretive events of the world, much like art and poetry. Unlike the sciences and mathematics, religion is more of a subjective, phenomenological experience, rather than logic, reason, and evidence. Presently, I align with a deistic worldview since I think some kind of intelligence created the universe. This “intelligence” could be a naturalistic cause, which is compatible with atheism, but I won’t commit to what exactly created the universe. I think practical reason, science, psychological research, sociology, history, and sociology are very good starting points to formulating an ethical framework that does not fall prey to radical relativism.
Hope all is well with you.
Sarah
Thanks for your response to my question, Sarah.
Nice job of formulating a clear and concise summary of your current outlook! I can assure you that your accomplishment in doing so far exceeds my own ability to have done the same. I find my own thinking to be very much in accord with what I take yours to be. I think that the mystery of ‘creation’ may forever remain, well, a mystery. Reason is a powerful mental attribute and the development of scientific thinking has facillitated some pretty amazing advancements for humanity. Still, there are non-rational aspects of our minds, beings, and lives that ought not be undervalued or neglected. Through the harmonization of our non-rational mental attributes with our rational minds I think there is ample room for the development of what can fairly be called human spirituality without necessitating an appeal to supernaturalism or demanding narrow thinking and the desperate continuation of primitive religious ideologies. I think that people, and hence society, can derive much benefit from the exploration of a variety of religious traditions and find something in all of them that is “true, beautiful, and good”.
But, as always, I could be wrong…
Peace Still
Steve
Steve,
Thanks for your kind compliment. I think that human spirituality is a phenomenological interpretation or response the world as it appears i.e., other people, ourselves, objects, our feelings, thoughts, and experiences. Life is quite paradoxical and complex, but with reason and emotion, it provides an invitation to reflect, ponder, search, listen, and learn, both by oneself and in community; that is, if one so chooses what Socrates proclaimed to be the continually examined life, which is the only life worth living.
Cheers,
Sarah
P.S. The attitude “I could be wrong” is an important stance towards that which possesses speculative evidence.
reveals a rough reality. But in its reliance on our capacity for experimentation, discovery, and cumulative knowledge, it solves all the great puzzles that people have tried to deal with through faith, philosophy, and alcohol and drugs.
Rosenberg, Alex (2011-09-26). The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions . Norton. Kindle Edition.
The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality
by Alex Rosenberg
http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalists-guide-to-reality/
“We all lie awake some nights asking questions about the universe, its meaning, our place in it, the meaning of life, and our lives, who we are, what we should do, as well as questions about god, free will, morality, mortality, the mind, emotions, love. These worries are a luxury compared to the ones most people on Earth address. But they are persistent. And yet they all have simple answers, ones we can pretty well read off from science.”
Just what I was looking for, simple answers to life’s most vexing questions!
I’m afraid this article did not lead me to believe that I ought to invest in his book to gain further illumination or insight into Rosenberg’s thinking. The article is definitely thought provoking and, much to my benefit, the comments posted in response to the article certainly contribute immensely to a better understanding of what Rosenberg is proposing for a philosophical neophyte such as myself.
Steve