William Rowe & the Problem of Evil
Here are some brief comments on Rowe’s evidential argument for atheism.
Unlike J.L. Mackie, William Rowe does not dispute the logical consistency between OG (orthodox theistic God) and evil because the theist could provide a valid deductive argument, such as the “G.E. Moore shift” construction that we will analyze later. In the meantime, for Rowe, the problem of evil rests in the disparity between the magnitude and frequency of intense suffering in the world and the existence of OG. In the vein of this worry, Rowe’s first premise and key claim runs as follows, “instances of intense suffering exist which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 240). The justification for this premise rests in the level of reasonableness for believing that OG could prevent at least some instances of intense suffering that we observe in the world without forfeiting a “greater good,” and that not all instances of intense suffering share an “intimate connection” with a “greater good” (Rowe, 242).
Following from premise (1), the second premise, which both theists and non-theists endorse, runs as follows: OG would prevent intense suffering or some evil equally bad or worse, unless he could not do so without forfeiting a greater good. The conclusion follows from (1) and (2) to boldly assert that (3) OG does not exist. Before analyzing Rowe’s central claim, it is important to note that the kind of suffering that he has in mind aligns with that which stands as unmotivated and undeserved suffering. While intense suffering does not equate with a greater good because it may eventually produce greater good or play an important role in this process, despite moral justification, such intense suffering still remains evil (Rowe, 242).
Given these parameters, we are now well situated to analyze his key claim. While his inductive inference may appear convincing, however, question remains whether premise (1) warrants sufficient epistemic justification for a claim to support his reasonable grounds for a denial of OG. Rowe even admits that, “we are often surprised by how things we thought to be unconnected turn out to be intimately connected” (Rowe, 243). Yet, Rowe decides that he has reached reasonable justification against the existence of OG based on the notion that it remains unfathomable to him how a higher good justifies all instances of intense suffering (Rowe, 243). This may not only beg the question with circular reasoning, but may run amuck in another fallacy, an appeal to ignorance. Simply because we do not seem to know of any higher good that instances of intense suffering does not necessarily provide reasonable grounds for atheism.
In response to Rowe, perhaps the OG theist could take his suggestion to use the “G.E. Moore’s shift” approach, which is a valid argument and negates Rowe’s conclusion with a new premise (1): “OG exists,” retains premise (2), and concludes: “It is not the case that OG can prevent evil without forfeiting a greater good or prevent some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 240). The question that remains here is whether this approach moves the focus from the problem of evil to arguments that establish the new premise, “OG God exists.” It appears to shift the argument away from evil and employ justification than extends beyond the task at hand, which is to work towards a solution to the problem of evil.
William Rowe, “Atheism and Evil” in Kessler, Gary. (1999). Philosophy of Religion: towards a global perspective. Ch. 5. pp. 238-246.
Theists who claim that the OG might have some unfathomable reason for evil have some serious problems to contend with. First the OG is generally conceded to be the god of the bible but this god does not exist in the bible as the bible contains multiple deities that get conflated. Furthermore this so called deity gives his reasons for evil which are contradictory and also are unjustified. It is certainly not all knowing. This is if we even allow the theist to get away with not explaining how a deity that acts as an evolved being with a nervous and endocrine system not to mention is described as having a body yet remains undetectable. It acts like a sociopath. It is in the words of Valerie Tarico hopelessly human. The theist is a functional atheist if that person thinks of their god as an abstract entity. Even if the person admits they dont believe in an OG based on the bible the issue remains that you cannot posit a greater mystery to explain a lesser. Not to mention that this person typically wants to describe this unfathomable thing and then say it communicates both which presuppose being fathomable. The whole idea is an inductive failure.
Well said. I’m thinking the only way for the theist to escape the problem of evil is to embrace process theology. While this seems to satisfy many, I find that it reduces God to a wimpy, passive, imaginary-friend-like being.
I think the process theology god you describe is the god of most evangelicals though they would deny it. I think the process theology god is not a valid answer anyway because the bible presupposes an ancient worldview. If this being were a creator it would certainly be far smarter than to write something like this. I think even if we found some ancient book that proved something like string theory was true with a bunch of equations etc that we would have to conclude it was from some advanced race of beings not a god.