Kant and Exceptions to the Moral Law
I am curious about the role of exceptions to Kant’s universalization of moral laws. To establish a duty, it must be universalizable, i.e., it must not produce any contradiction to assert that everyone should abide by a certain maxim. Kant recognizes the deception of inclination and wants to construct a formal system to avoid corrupting the moral law with selfish motives. Certainly, sometimes individuals violate the commands of duty through personal excuses or justifications, i.e.,
“only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favor or (just for one time only) in favor of our inclination. Consequently, if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we really do recognize the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from us” (4:424).
In this passage, Kant points out the tendency of individuals to justify with exceptions breaking the moral law. However, there seem to be certain types of exceptions that Kant permits. For instance, cases that involve telling a lie to a murderer in order to save a life are permissible because 1) not telling the truth in this case is universalizable without contradiction, and 2) the act of lying in this particular scenario does not involve selfish interest, but rather, reveals an impelling pull or moral force to not tell the truth to the murderer. According to Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy by, Heiner Bielefeldt, instances that satisfy universalizability and does not involve selfish interest or inclination clashes with moral maxim and reveals the need for modification. This seems to open a process of learning and malleability to Kant’s conception of moral normativity under a formal system (categorical imperative) (73). In cases that allow for lying, the action is universalizable and thus, becomes an exemplar for all individuals who are or may in the future find themselves in the same scenario.
The notion of creating a moral precedent remains key to affording exceptions to the moral law. Instances that draw out new moral precedents, such as exceptions of lying to murderers in order to save a life, establish normative force and retains some level of human subjectivity in the universalization process. This process of creating or recognizing moral force, relates to a question posed on the first day of class. In general, as empirical/sensual agents, is it ever possible to transcend inclination and the senses in which we establish universal moral law (assuming objective moral principles can exist)? More specifically, if we allow for exceptions to the moral law that involve impelling moral force or creates a moral precedence that satisfies universalization requirements, does the phenomena of creating a moral precedence not in fact mix with, if not derive from, sentiment/emotion/inclination? Other than mathematical perception, is perception of moral situations ever completely free from inclination/sentiment? Either way, as discussed towards the end of class, how can agents both produce and subjugate themselves to an objective moral law that is in some sense not in the world, yet we create it?
