“only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favor or (just for one time only) in favor of our inclination. Consequently, if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we really do recognize the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from us” (4:424).

In this passage, Kant points out the tendency of individuals to justify with exceptions breaking the moral law. However, there seem to be certain types of exceptions that Kant permits. For instance, cases that involve telling a lie to a murderer in order to save a life are permissible because 1) not telling the truth in this case is universalizable without contradiction, and 2) the act of lying in this particular scenario does not involve selfish interest, but rather, reveals an impelling pull or moral force to not tell the truth to the murderer. According to Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy by, Heiner Bielefeldt, instances that satisfy universalizability and does not involve selfish interest or inclination clashes with moral maxim and reveals the need for modification. This seems to open a process of learning and malleability to Kant’s conception of moral normativity under a formal system (categorical imperative) (73). In cases that allow for lying, the action is universalizable and thus, becomes an exemplar for all individuals who are or may in the future find themselves in the same scenario.

The notion of creating a moral precedent remains key to affording exceptions to the moral law. Instances that draw out new moral precedents, such as exceptions of lying to murderers in order to save a life, establish normative force and retains some level of human subjectivity in the universalization process. This process of creating or recognizing moral force, relates to a question posed on the first day of class. In general, as empirical/sensual agents, is it ever possible to transcend inclination and the senses in which we establish universal moral law (assuming objective moral principles can exist)? More specifically, if we allow for exceptions to the moral law that involve impelling moral force or creates a moral precedence that satisfies universalization requirements, does the phenomena of creating a moral precedence not in fact mix with, if not derive from, sentiment/emotion/inclination? Other than mathematical perception, is perception of moral situations ever completely free from inclination/sentiment? Either way, as discussed towards the end of class, how can agents both produce and subjugate themselves to an objective moral law that is in some sense not in the world, yet we create it?

Robert Nozick presents an interesting view of God that claims to couch the problem of evil in the conflict between God’s attributes of justice and mercy. The orthodox theist’s God must possess these two traits in order to stand as ultimate judge and benevolent being. Evil events unfold also due to a division in God’s motivation behind the world’s creation. “In the beginning,” God wanted to subsist in “Aristotelian contemplation,” while another part of God desired to create the world. It is the self-satisfied aspect of God that resisted creation of the world, and thus, represents the causal link between strife in God’s divine and the finite, earthly realm (Nozick, 259).

It is this notion of strife in the divine realm that offers new insight into the problem of evil. Rather than refer to God who merrily exists in the blissful heavens, while the finite world groans in its pain, the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition aims to close this gap. Under the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition, God is not an untouchable, detached entity, but rather, suffers alongside humanity; events, such as the holocaust, result from a divine rift in the universe or the divine realm. If this is the case, the question arises as to the nature of God’s character that produces evil and strife.

To address this worry over God’s questionable character, Nozick refers to a view that proposes creation as God’s “self-expression” (Nozick, 266). That is, God does not create a perfect world, but rather, produces one that reflects his likeness or divine image. Such images or reflections do not accommodate perfection since they represent only one possible image of God. However, they do capture “many salient aspects” of God (Nozick, 266). This fascinating approach leads Nozick to suggest that perhaps the most perfect being amounts to the most “actual being” in the sense that he suffers along with humanity, yet creates the universe as a “self-expression” filled with many, but not all of His aspects.

While this does close the gap, to some degree, between a human’s phenomenological experiences of evil as compared to the nature of God’s dwellings in the divine realm, questions regarding God’s character arise. It is left up to the reader to decide whether this move makes God so “actual” that it undermines his character as a capable creator of the universe. Not only may this view undermine God’s omni-qualities, but it may also lend credence to the view that posits God as an emanation of the human imagination.

Robert Nozick, “Theological Explanations” in Philosophy of Religion: towards a global perspective. (1999). Gary Kessler. Ch. 5.

Unlike J.L. Mackie, William Rowe does not dispute the logical consistency between OG (orthodox theistic God) and evil because the theist could provide a valid deductive argument, such as the “G.E. Moore shift” construction that we will analyze later. In the meantime, for Rowe, the problem of evil rests in the disparity between the magnitude and frequency of intense suffering in the world and the existence of OG. In the vein of this worry, Rowe’s first premise and key claim runs as follows, “instances of intense suffering exist which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 240). The justification for this premise rests in the level of reasonableness for believing that OG could prevent at least some instances of intense suffering that we observe in the world without forfeiting a “greater good,” and that not all instances of intense suffering share an “intimate connection” with a “greater good” (Rowe, 242).

Following from premise (1), the second premise, which both theists and non-theists endorse, runs as follows: OG would prevent intense suffering or some evil equally bad or worse, unless he could not do so without forfeiting a greater good. The conclusion follows from (1) and (2) to boldly assert that (3) OG does not exist. Before analyzing Rowe’s central claim, it is important to note that the kind of suffering that he has in mind aligns with that which stands as unmotivated and undeserved suffering. While intense suffering does not equate with a greater good because it may eventually produce greater good or play an important role in this process, despite moral justification, such intense suffering still remains evil (Rowe, 242).

Given these parameters, we are now well situated to analyze his key claim. While his inductive inference may appear convincing, however, question remains whether premise (1) warrants sufficient epistemic justification for a claim to support his reasonable grounds for a denial of OG. Rowe even admits that, “we are often surprised by how things we thought to be unconnected turn out to be intimately connected” (Rowe, 243). Yet, Rowe decides that he has reached reasonable justification against the existence of OG based on the notion that it remains unfathomable to him how a higher good justifies all instances of intense suffering (Rowe, 243). This may not only beg the question with circular reasoning, but may run amuck in another fallacy, an appeal to ignorance. Simply because we do not seem to know of any higher good that instances of intense suffering does not necessarily provide reasonable grounds for atheism.
In response to Rowe, perhaps the OG theist could take his suggestion to use the “G.E. Moore’s shift” approach, which is a valid argument and negates Rowe’s conclusion with a new premise (1): “OG exists,” retains premise (2), and concludes: “It is not the case that OG can prevent evil without forfeiting a greater good or prevent some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 240). The question that remains here is whether this approach moves the focus from the problem of evil to arguments that establish the new premise, “OG God exists.” It appears to shift the argument away from evil and employ justification than extends beyond the task at hand, which is to work towards a solution to the problem of evil.

William Rowe, “Atheism and Evil” in Kessler, Gary. (1999). Philosophy of Religion: towards a global perspective. Ch. 5. pp. 238-246.

Michael Licona’s The Resurrection of Jesus, a New Historiographical Approach is a comprehensive collection of information that tailors to the evangelical understanding of Jesus’ resurrection. This accessible and scholarly book is a must read for those with interests in historical Jesus studies. Whether one agrees with Licona’s conclusions or not, his book is worth reading for a solid overview of historical methods and the historical Jesus from a various positions. His fair treatment of competing views provides for an informative tour through the predominant views surrounding the historical Jesus. The “new historiographical approach” is supposed to fill a void in historical Jesus research with a “carefully defined and extensive historical method” (Licona, 20). Although not entirely new, Licona’s historiographical approach presents an extensive collection of historical methods, a discussion of bias or personal “horizon”, offers suggestions for assuaging biases, and offers a case that Jesus rose from the dead. This case includes textual evidence, extra-biblical evidence, an epistemology that encompasses coherence theory, and inference to the best explanation (hereafter IBE). Given the lengthy, but deep engagement with textual interpretation, many in-house debates could ensue, such as a current debate over the historical significance of Matthew 27. However, my review will focus on key arguments supporting the resurrection hypothesis (RH) from the historical bedrock, and ultimately conclude that RH does not succeed as the best explanation.

In outline, Chapter 1 presents various approaches to historical inquiry and the challenges that face accurate interpretation of the data. Chapter 2 offers a defense of miracles and addresses multiple views of miracles from Hume, C. Behan McCullagh, John Meier, and Bart Ehrman. Chapter 3 ranks the reliability of Biblical and extra-Biblical sources pertaining to the death and resurrection of Jesus. Chapter 4 aims to establish the “historical bedrock” or facts that hold the most agreement of Jesus and his resurrection. Chapter 5 evaluates five resurrection hypothesis: Vermes’s hypothesis, Goulder’s hypothesis, Lüdemann hypothesis, Crossan’s hypothesis, Craffert’s hypothesis, and Licona’s view, the resurrection hypothesis.

Chapter 1: Important Considerations on Historical Inquiry Pertaining to the Truth in Ancient Texts.

Chapter 1 presents an overview of historical methods outside of biblical studies, the challenges that face one’s historical research (e.g. one’s ”horizon”), and discusses the philosophy of history. Amidst this discussion, Licona reveals his agenda and methodology, which as he proclaims, “was conducted more in the interest of confirming my faith and for use in apologetic presentations than being an open investigation in which I would follow the evidence where it led me” (Licona, 131). His historical method utilizes inference to the best explanation (IBE) over statistical inference since the resurrection and miracle events represent one-time events, which do not comply with the method of statistical inference. Given chosen historical method and personal biases, this chapter highlights a crucial point that personal agendas, biases, and hopes for certain outcomes jeopardizes the truth that one ultimately seeks or at least purports to seek.

In order to alleviate bias, Licona offers several helpful suggestions: 1) Historians should use a method to foster greater objectivity. 2) Historians need to publically state their horizon or biases. 3) Have an awareness of his or her peer group pressure. 4) Submit arguments or ideas to scholars who do not agree with your view and engage with criticism. 5) Begin historical research with investigation of the historical facts that historical scholars endorse. These facts represent an event’s “historical bedrock” that Historical hypotheses should account for in order to remain in the running as a reliable fact. 6) Detach from personal bias as much as possible (Licona, 50-60). These points apply to many areas beyond history and will prove useful in almost any quest for truth.

Chapter 2: The Historian and Miracles

This chapter begins with a critique of a Humean view of miracles. Before analyzing his reasons, it is worth noting that even if one’s critique of Hume’s view of miracles succeeds, this does nothing to help the case for Jesus’ resurrection since a non-Humean approach can equally discredit miraculous events. This is because one may use IBE, criteria from legal testimony, and criteria for credible eyewitness testimony to arrive at a low probability assessment, if not a complete rejection of Jesus’ resurrection as a plausible scenario.

To address Hume’s view of miracles, Licona highlights Hume’s view of testimony, which indicates that an event:

“Must be attested by sufficient number of witnesses of ‘unquestioned good sense, education, and learning,’ and of such ‘undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion’ of deceit. Moreover, these witnesses are to be of such a high reputation in the eyes of others, that they would have much to lose if lying. The event must be performed publicly in a major part of the world so that its visibility would be unavoidable” (Licona, 138).

In response to this, Licona claims that, “if Hume’s criteria for accepting testimony as true were employed outside of miracle-claims, we would probably have to dismiss the vast majority of what we believe we presently know about the past” (Licona, 138-139). Without providing examples to support this claim, the paragraph ends with a curt comment that historians still offer historical judgments even if they do not meet Hume’s criteria with the use of “criteria for authenticity and arguments to the best explanation.” While this last part is true, the problem for the bold claim about dismissing vast amounts of history points to the fact that widely accepted, historical events and figures in history do not include miracle claims. In fact, most all of events in history survive Hume’s criteria about reliable testimony quite well. Licona first needs to provide evidence for his statement in order to motivate his claim, which is supposed to weaken Hume’s criteria.

Licona’s second criticism refers to Hume’s concern with intelligence and integrity of witnesses. If evidence for a miracle is credible and no plausible natural explanation exists, to reject it based on the fact that many other miracle claims exist among the uneducated and ignorant is guilty of the ad hominem fallacy (Licona, 139). While he is correct with this assertion, Hume’s point, which should have different wording, is a good one; that the problem for miracles does not rest in the characteristics of ancient cultures (e.g. ignorance and gullibility). Rather, it rests with the fact that certain cultures made miracle claims that abundant naturalistic explanations account for over time. While this well evidenced claim is not enough to completely reject miracle claims as potentially true, since a unique event with minimal evidence may be true, it does give good reason for caution in assigning miracle status to an event.

Licona’s third criticism of Hume surrounds his principle of analogy. I agree that Hume’s principle cannot single-handedly eliminate the possibility of miracles (i.e. miracles do not exist in the present, so they do not exist in the past). However, the principle of analogy does provide compelling evidence that, when combined with the following: IBE, legal testimony, and eyewitness criteria, it adds to a cumulative case for or against a particular miracle claim. The complaint that the principle of analogy would eliminate the existence of dinosaurs is incorrect because compelling evidence supports the life and extinction of dinosaurs. While I understand the problem with trying to use the principle of analogy alone to reject miracles (e.g. ‘x’ does not currently happen, ergo, it never happened in the past), the example that Licona uses to make this point fails due to overwhelming evidence that shows the inapplicability of the analogy principle to dinosaurs. Since overwhelming evidence shows the inapplicability of the analogy principle to dinosaurs, another example needs to apply. Hume’s point is a good one, that if there is no familiarity with something now and no evidence to support that it occurs now or anytime in history, a high level of skepticism in support of the item in question is warranted.

Towards the end of chapter two, Licona asserts his definition of a miracle “as an event in history for which natural explanations are inadequate. I am contending that we may identify a miracle when the event is (1) is extremely unlikely to have occurred given the circumstances and/or natural law and (2) occurs in an environment or context charged with religious significance” (Licona, 171). If these criterion find fulfillment in the resurrection hypothesis (RH), and RH is the best explanation of the historical bedrock, then the historian may warrant that a miracle occurred.

I find this miracle criterion problematic due to the fact that point (1) assumes that criteria exists to discern a supernatural event and relies on a plea from ignorance. Simply because an event appears mysterious or unlikely, and one cannot provide a natural explanation does not automatically rule out natural explanations. If one wants to establish a supernatural explanation, then one must give criteria for determining such an explanation that moves beyond the mystery factor. What this would be, I think theists have yet to produce (1). Point (2) is even more problematic because a highly charged religious climate does nothing to support a miraculous event. The only viable criteria that Licona offers here is IBE and how well the evidence explains the historical bedrock.

Interestingly, the principle of analogy does align miracles in the bible with various legends that no one accepts as historical very well. It also provides solid reason to hold much caution in affirming miracle events. Thus, when the principle of analogy combines with IBE, eyewitness testimony, and legal case criteria, it provides significant insight into a case for or against a historical claim. With this in mind, lets move forward to assess the comprehensive evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.

Chapter 3: Historical Sources Pertaining to the Resurrection of Jesus

This chapter opens with a discussion of Canonical Gospels genre (i.e. mythology and biography), gospel dating, dependency between the books, the Q source, oral formulas (i.e. oral traditions in worship or baptismal settings may have come from an earlier source, so they are earlier than they appear in the New Testament), and non-Christian sources mentioning Jesus. Licona also discusses the debate over Paul’s interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection as bodily or spiritual. He rates the following documents that “possibly” reflect oral sources prior to the Gospels: Josephus, Tacitus, Thallus (barely), Clement of Rome (possible-plus), and Barnabus (possible-minus). The rest (canonical Gospels, Clement of Rome, Rabbinic sources, Celsus, Mara bar Serapion, Suetonius, Pliny the Younger, Thallus, Tacitus, Polycarp, the Acts speeches, and the Gospel of Thomas), are under the “unlikely” category.

The central claim of this chapter asserts that oral traditions exist throughout the New Testament and provide the best evidence that supports the reliability of apostolic teaching of Jesus’ ministry and resurrection. The fact that Paul and perhaps other Jerusalem apostles, Peter, James, and John, mentioned in the kerygma, provide multiple accounts of Jesus’ ministry and resurrection (Licona, 275). Dunn’s criteria provides some support highlighting influence from the Jerusalem Church given the grammar, parallelism, an untypical term for Paul to use, and word order in Romans 1:3b-4a. The only exception is the “primitive description of Christ’s resurrection as ‘the resurrection of the dead’” because the verse does not read the same as the primitive description. ‘The resurrection of the dead” yields a different meaning than the primitive description; “of the dead,” a general phrase is different from the particular phrase, “his resurrection from the dead.” Despite this, I find the evidence presented in this chapter quite compelling that apostolic influence permeates Paul’s writings.

As for Paul’s conversion story, it is worth using caution towards its reliability since, according to Licona, “we have no material written by Paul (Saul) during his pre-Christian life, no written material by Jewish leaders during the time of Paul’s ministry describing his conversion, no documents from the Roman or Jewish governing bodies that mention the Christian sect, nothing about apostolic preaching, and no reports that Jesus rose from the dead” (Licona, 275). Despite this, if the facts of Paul’s life are well supported and reliable, which remains debatable, this chapter offers strong ties between Paul and apostolic teaching.

Chapters 4 & 5: The Historical Bedrock Pertaining to the Fate of Jesus

Chapter four presents evidence that identifies widely accepted facts about Jesus as a miracle worker, as an eschatological agent, His predictions of His death and Resurrection, the bedrock that applies to Jesus’ fate, appearances to the Disciples, the conversion of Paul, Paul’s beliefs about the resurrection of Jesus, the conversion of James, and the empty tomb. The chapter ends with the following bedrock: 1) Jesus died by crucifixion. 2) Shortly after Jesus’ death, the disciples had experiences that led them to believe that Jesus appeared to them. 3) Several years after Jesus’ death, Paul converted to Christianity after a post-resurrection appearance of Jesus to him and taught about the resurrection of the body (Licona, 463).

Chapter five, my favorite chapter, offers an impressive analysis of six resurrection hypotheses. Licona’s fair presentation of each view includes an analysis of how each one fares IBE criterion. This chapter highlights worthy concerns for each view outside of RH, such as a naturalistic bias and assertions that assume too much (e.g. reason requires naturalistic explanations over supernatural explanations). However, even granting all of the proposed historical bedrock of Jesus death and resurrection, I do not think he has made a convincing case that RH stands out as the best explanations above all others.

First, the assertion that RH “explains all of our bedrock without any strain whatsoever” is a hasty induction (Licona, 600). Basing RH’s explanatory power above all other possible explanations based on the historical bedrock leaves a gap between how humans can know or identify a supernatural event. Licona’s criterion for a miracle contains the assertion that “the event occurs in a context charged with religious significance” (Licona, 468). But this seems to work against reliable identification of a miracle in the sense that religiously charged contexts may cloud the individual’s interpretation of an event more than contexts with little religious, emotional influence.

Second, Licona does not allow for hallucination or mistaken visions, which are well documented in neuroscience research (2). In fact, an individual under distressing situations can experience a one-time hallucination. It is difficult to see how one could rule out the possibility that Paul experienced a hallucination. Certainly, this does not automatically eradicate the possibility of a supernatural event such as, Jesus’ post-resurrection appearance. What this evidence does do is leave options open in a way that does not help RH’s claim as the best explanation of the historical bedrock.

Third, Licona admits that establishing the plausibility of RH is difficult because it requires a supernatural explanation (Licona, 601). This highlights a significant problem for reaching best explanations for supernatural or miracle events if a reliable criterion does not exist for such assertions. So far, we have personal testimony without evidence beyond personal experiences in a religiously charged context. But this seems to leave much room for speculation and does not establish the case for RH one way or the other. Reasons why will unravel in more detail in the next two points.

Fourth, without presupposing anything about God, one can take a “position of openness”, as Licona suggests, and arrive at the conclusion that reasoning from the ground up does not help establish RH as the best explanation. One need not presuppose naturalism, agnosticism, or even supernaturalism to realize that RH fails IBE criterion two, three, and four (especially the fourth). Operating from a position of openness reveals that invoking a miracle event or supernatural intervention is the least parsimonious and most ad hoc from all other explanations. The reason is not due to a presupposition of naturalism, but rather, it means the existence of a reliable method or criterion for identifying supernatural events remains a mystery. To base a miracle event on claims to ignorance, personal experiences, and the consideration of whether an event makes sense in a “religiously charged context” does not account for a supernatural explanation. However, it does explain the existence of certain facts. The case for supernaturalism needs to bridge the gap between how one jumps from certain facts to a supernatural event.

Fifth, even if I presuppose a personal, omni-competent God, this leads to undesirable implications for RH’s case under IBE. The underwhelming historical bedrock is evidence enough that God is probably not interested in revealing His message to the world. If eternal destinies remain at stake, I do not think it is unreasonable to expect overwhelming appearances of the resurrected Jesus as opposed to a select few. While I agree that simply because we do not have more desirable evidence, that RH does not fail as a plausible explanation. However, it does present a challenge to establish RH as the best explanation.

To assert that a naturalistic explanation fares better than a supernatural explanation does not automatically mean that someone necessarily presupposes naturalism or remains captive to personal bias. While biases remain a challenge to anyone seeking truth, I do think that if one utilizes Licona’s suggestions for resisting bias, then it is impossible to arrive at conclusions from a perspective of openness. Given the lack of a good theistic or supernatural explanation, this points to the fact that more work must occur to establish one. While supernatural events may very well occur, however, it is best to refrain from supernatural conclusions until a reliable account surfaces (3).

Even if those in favor of supernaturalism and RH claim that they need not produce an accurate account that identifies supernatural events, that testimony and IBE is all they need, problems remain; that is, multiple explanations for visions, conversions, and an empty tomb (this does not reside in the historical bedrock), remain available in a way that does not allow supernatural events to win out above all other explanations. Those in favor of RH could claim that these comments reflect a presupposition of naturalism. However, an analysis from the openness position could conclude that it remains a mystery as to how one accounts for supernatural or miraculous explanations; that is, without committing an argument from ignorance and committing a hasty inference.

(1) See Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation for an excellent analysis of explanatory power and theistic or supernatural explanations.
(2)http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2702442/; http://www.acnr.co.uk/pdfs/volume4issue2/v4i2reviewart3.pdf.
(3) On this topic, see Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation and Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles.

A question that I have is whether a sentimentalist or other non-rational account of moral capabilities could account for moral objectivity. Even if Nichols is correct, that psychopathy supports a sentimentalist moral account, it appears that psychopaths do support objective morality given our capacity to judge psychopathy as a maladaptive feature of humanity existence. Furthermore, even if moral judgment derives from affective capacities, is it possible to maintain a rationalistic account? Perhaps moral judgment requires both rational and affective capabilities. More later….

I am agnostic towards the existence of heaven and hell, but as for Rauser, I think he could have chosen a less emotionally charged example. Emotional example or not, the point still stands that if Christianity is true, then it seems to make the most sense for an omni-competent God to perform a “limited override” of human freewill without reducing humans to automatons.

Calvinists are comfortable with the notion that God overrides freewill in certain individuals to believe, so why can’t God override all human freewill? I guess his mysterious plan must have it this way. Libertarian freewill proponents will object and say that overriding uninhibited freewill destroys authentic relationship. But so what if eternity is at stake? If heaven is a “place” of “perfect existence,” I do not see how uninhabited freewill could exist there, so why not arrange things in such a way that all humans recognize the truth? For God to do otherwise discredits his existence.

-Adorno, Theodor W. (1979 [1969]) ‘On the Logic of the Social Sciences’, in Tim Dant, (2003). The Critical Social Theory.

Feenberg claims that the “masters of technical systems” possess enormous power that overshadows political democracy. Under their technological instrumentalism and rationalism, the extent to which technology is social merely depends upon its ability to meet human needs. Against the claim that technology relates to the social aspect of society through instrumental means alone, Feenberg asserts such a view upholds a false dichotomy between technological rationalism and the social nature of society. First, technology is neither deterministic nor neutral, but rather, it exists as an inherent feature of human social activity. Thus, technology entails both rational and social dimensions within hegemonic relations. Against determinist, rationalist hegemony, Feenberg believes that there must be a way to rationalize society in a way that promotes democracy rather than centralized control. Such an approach works to illustrate the non-autonomy of technology and the social impacts of technology that “the West” overlooks (Feenberg, 5).

The predominant view of technology in the West embraces one or both of the following forms of technological determinism: 1) Technology develops in a unilateral fashion from less advanced to more advanced configurations. 2) Social situations must adapt to the “imperatives of the technological base” that determines the nature of social existence. To the contrary of such deterministic views, Feenberg asserts a constructivist, social scientific approach that undermines such paradigm because of its stance that technology remains largely underdetermined. That is, technology represents a social variable as opposed to a rationalistic “key to the riddle of history” (Feenberg, 8). As a social phenomenon, technology consists of social meaning and “cultural horizon.” That is, the social meaning applies to the way in which a technological object will function in a context while the cultural horizon involves how individuals understand or interpret and place technology. To overcome deterministic rationalism, which wields efficiency as its quality standard, Feenberg suggests that the way to oppose technological hegemony exists in the capacity to alter conceptions of rationalization, which derives from “understanding human and natural contexts of technological action” (aka. “Subversive rationalization”).

The connection between human situations such as “the use of nuclear power and surrogate motherhood” and their relationship to technology reveals that technology does not exist as disconnected, self-generating phenomena (Feenberg, 9). Rather, social context determines the role of technology as both the social and technological aspects of human existence change over time. “What an object is for the group that ultimately decide its fate determines what it becomes as it is redesigned and improved over time. If this is true, then we can understand technological development only by studying the sociopolitical situation of the various groups involved in it” (Feenberg, 11). As such, Freeman remains hopeful that technology and American society will become more democratic.

They key move to achieve increased democracy within American society and technological advancement rests in social constructs that stand opposed to dominant hegemony. Only then may a society eradicate a removed, rationalistic, and deterministic technological paradigm that Heidegger refers to as a system to which “only a God can save us” from (i.e. technological disaster and/or domination). Despite the current capitalist framework that uses technology in ways that prevent democracy, Freeman remains hopeful that a type of non-communist socialism will emerge to promote a more democratic social existence. Since technology is inherently social, a society’s social construct must remain the focus towards implementation of a democratic social and technological existence.

A) Human alienation from themselves, others, and the environment.

B) Narcissism.

C) Jeopardization of productivity.

D) Cultivates a wasteland for time that could invest in more constructive activities in the actual world.

I predict that Facebook will increase the prevalence of low quality writing, un-critical thinking, un-clear speaking, unorganized thought, increased sensationalism, and an increase in self-promotion. All such characteristics derive from alienates beings from their essential nature (aka. Marxian “species-being”). Individuals who possess the capacity to reason well, learn, and communicate with others, and yet, fail to exercise these faculties, exist as fragmented beings; that is, humans who devote their time to daily or even weekly virtual communication, expose themselves to fragmenting systems. Facebook not only deteriorates human reason and alienates human beings from themselves, others, and God (speaking to those who believe in a personal God), but it also facilitates the most pernicious human characteristic to humans and society; that is, excessive pride and narcissism.

Is there hope for a constructive use of Facebook and other forms of social media (e.g. Twitter)? Well, I think such mediums are here to stay, but I remain optimistic that its usage yields more positives than negatives when utilized in a certain manner. Here are some suggestions:

1) Use social media maybe once a week at most. Most of your time should be spent with people in your actual environment. If individuals in within the realm of your actual environment need to get a hold of you or vice versa, use the phone or email. These technological mediums are more personal and direct. Displaying one’s social life online builds pride and objectifies Facebook “friendships.”

2) Do not bother responding to merely emotive, critical responses to your posts (e.g. “no way!” “really?” “whatever…”). Facebook encourages fragmented thought and emotive reasoning. If such individuals insist on discussing a matter, try to meet with the person in the actual world or email directly with them outside of the public spectacle of a FB status.

3) Promoting one’s accomplishments, activities, and thoughts are all good and inherent to the social nature of humanity. However, if posts demonstrate a high level of self-promotion, it is time to reflect on your self-esteem and success in the actual world. Often times, narcissistic behavior online is a symptom of a dissatisfied non-virtual world existence.

4) Use Facebook as an outlet to practice writing skills, grammar, and spelling. Do not use moronic texting language.

5) Monitor reasons for signing onto Facebook often. This most likely indicates dissatisfaction with your social situation in the actual world. Having a healthy social existence in the actual world tends to lessen the need for Facebook usage.

6) I tend to notice that serious academics do not use Facebook frequently. The correlation between a successful academic and their minimal time spent on Facebook speaks volumes.

I have much more to say, but will leave it here for now.

The scope of this paper will analyze Mackie’s epistemological argument concerning the lack of connection between moral facts and natural facts. Mackie’s key claim rests on the assumption that current ways of detecting objective values from intuition, reason, inference, sense perception, conceptual analysis, or a combination of these sorts fail to close the knowledge gap between individuals and “authoritatively prescriptive” objective values (Mackie, 96). As a result, of this gap, a “special kind” of intuition is the only method to detect objective values. Since this “special kind” of mental faculty is unidentifiable, moral values cannot exist in an objectively, prescriptive sense, objective moral values do not exist.

Mackie’s epistemological argument from queerness takes the following form:

1) If moral values are objective and authoritatively prescriptive, then the
connection between moral and natural facts is clear.
2) It is not the case that the connection between moral and natural facts is clear.
3) Therefore, it is not the case that moral values are objective and authoritatively
prescriptive.

While premises (1) and (2) are controversial, I think premise 2 is the most objectionable. The question that comes to mind is, does Mackie sufficiently establish the knowledge gap argument between natural and moral facts? Leading up to premise (2), Mackie asserts that a “special faculty” must exist in order to detect objective moral values necessarily exist as a Platonic Form. But since such a faculty does not exist and we have yet to identify a clear connection between natural and moral facts, therefore, individuals cannot access objective moral values through current cognitive faculties. However, I think the appeal to “a special faculty” leaves Mackie immersed in an ambiguous claim. What exactly does a special faculty entail? How does he know that current cognitive faculties fail to yield data about objective values? Without naming what this special faculty would need to be, Mackie dismisses knowledge of objective moral values based on an assumption that nothing in the world contains “goodness” or “wrongness” (Mackie, 97).

Despite the fact that Mackie explicitly states his rejection of logical positivism, in the sense that he does not dismiss objective morality based on un-verifiability alone, however, his moral skepticism requires this knowledge claim, especially given premise 2. Since entities like mathematical truths, morals, space and time, ect…. are also queer to Mackie, given that the connection between individuals and these entities are not obvious to him, Mackie asks good questions about how objects possess moral values and equates objective moral values with Platonic Forms. However, the move to equate moral values with Platonic Forms commits an over-simplification. It is possible for objective moral values to exist without a Platonic Form given John McDowell’s version, which I will discuss later in this paper. Before arriving at a Platonic definition of objective values, Mackie needs to distinguish between how one arrives at knowledge of the external world verses objective moral values.

Despite Mackie’s reference to Richard Price’s “companions in guilt” objection , I think he avoids answering it with the following assertion: “the only adequate reply would be to show how we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot begin to do this here, but I have undertaken some parts elsewhere” (Mackie, 96). Epistemological claims “made elsewhere” in regards to Price’s objection rest in his central idea that no current faculty bridges the gap between the human realm of knowledge and external moral values.

While Mackie does admit that it seems absurd to break with common sense concerning objective moral values, he thinks belief in them is false and illusory: “the assertion that there are objective values, which ordinary moral judgments presupposed, is, I hold, not meaningless, but false” (Mackie, 96). “False” based on what foundation? False based on the fact that individuals cannot access the existence of external, prescriptive values. But how is it the case that individuals cannot access objective moral facts? Mackie does not say except for the fact that a knowledge gap exists between individuals and meta-ethical claims about the nature of “good,” “right,” or “wrong” (aka. second-order ethical claims). Other than apparent disagreement about objective values or lack of understanding the connection between natural and moral facts, he does not provide an epistemological story as to how it is plausible to move from the assumed knowledge gap to the non-existence of objective moral values.

Without necessarily appealing to “companions in guilt” as Richard Price does, the objection to Mackie’s anti-realism could instead focus on the epistemological reasoning behind moral skepticism, which requires empirical verifiability as its main criteria (aka. logical positivism). Moral skepticism assumes that objective moral values do not exist because of a knowledge gap between human reason and objective values. However, the problem rests not only in the fact that Mackie has not distinguished between how one attains knowledge of objective scientific laws verses how one ascertains external moral facts. The more problematic claim rests in an ambiguous “special faculty” (that we do not currently have) without explaining what this should entail.

Rather than appeal to “companions in guilt” or mere common sense, the moral realist could instead offer an argument similar to John H. McDowell’s claims in “Values and Secondary Qualities” (1985). That is, objective “goodness” need not have only two options i.e., either objective moral value exists externally as a Platonic Form that a “special faculty” gains access to or anti-moral realism is true. Why? Because McDowell’s thesis, that “the good” equates with the disposition of external facts to produce moral judgments, splits this false dichotomy. Under McDowell’s version of moral realism, “the good” exists externally in the sense that such objects possess the disposition to produce certain reactions.

For example, if I am snorkeling and see a shark from afar, my sense of fear derives from external facts about the shark (e.g. its teeth are sharp, sharks sometimes bite humans that can lead to death, ect…). Like “fear”, “goodness” exists in external facts or dispositions to cause certain reactions. Such a view does not exclude visceral responses nor does it exclude external facts of the matter. That is, my “fear” of the shark does not reside within my internal state or opinion, but in external factors. However, my internal states play a role since they react to external facts or states of affairs. The moral realist may split the horn of Mackie’s dilemma or at least close the knowledge gap with a view like McDowell’s (1985) because dispositions (i.e. arrangements of physical objects or events in such a way as to cause a reaction) are not queer.

Under McDowell’s moral realism, an object’s “goodness” equates with its disposition to provide individuals with reason to seek that object. Dispositions contain moral values in the sense that they produce a response in the agent or provide individuals with a reason to act. Furthermore, dispositions of objects or events ground objective values because facts of the matter, whether about actions that involves moral actions (e.g. exercising the death penalty) or scientific experimentation, possess dispositions to produce moral imperatives or scientific knowledge. Despite the fact that McDowell’s view is not immune to problems concerning disagreement over dispositions, however, disagreement does not lead to anti-realism or moral skepticism. That is, the dispositions of external objects, events, or situations produce moral values that remain accessible through observation and reason. Thus, an appeal to a “special faculty” is unnecessary given the adequacy of dispositions to possess objective moral values.

References:

Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (New York: Penguin, 1977).
McDowell, John H. “Values and Secondary Qualities”, in Ted Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985), pp. 110–29.

Pertaining to narcissism, watch out for the following traits in people who propose to be leaders:

He or she has a grandiose sense of self-importance (exaggerates accomplishments and demands to be considered superior without real evidence of achievement).
He or she lives in a dream world of exceptional success, power, beauty, genius, or “perfect” love.
He or she thinks of him- or herself as “special” or privileged, and that he or she can only be understood by other special or high-status people.
He or she demands excessive amounts of praise or admiration from others.
He or she feels entitled to automatic deference, compliance, or favorable treatment from others.
He or she is exploitative towards others and takes advantage of them.
He or she lacks empathy and does not recognize or identify with others’ feelings.
He or she is frequently envious of others or thinks that they are envious of him or her.
He or she “has an attitude” or frequently acts in haughty or arrogant ways.

http://www.minddisorders.com/Kau-Nu/Narcissistic-personality-disorder.html

Here is an excerpt from an article by a social psychologist, Dr. Allen McConnell is a researcher in “the social self”.

“Ironically, it’s a story that few can relate to in their own lives. Yet, that’s also part of its compelling nature. Social psychology research indicates that we typically reflect on our own lives through comparisons to others. This social comparison process is automatic and very common, and these comparisons have important consequences for our emotional reactions. When one compares the self to worse-off others, one can feel better even in bad circumstances. For instance, people suffering from the recent floods in the Midwest “feel fortunate” when they compare themselves to others who have suffered far worst natural disasters (e.g., the tsunami in Japan).

When we compare ourselves to those who are better off, also known as upward social comparison, we typically feel worse. A student who gets Bs in his college classes will feel worse about himself when he compares himself to his sister who got all As in the same semester.

This raises an interesting question. Shouldn’t people reflecting on Kate and William lead them to feel worse instead of better? That is, this is a couple with tremendous physical beauty, that people everywhere adore, and will probably someday assume control of a national trust of over $17-Billion Pound Sterling. Shouldn’t such upward comparisons hurt rather than be the topic of intrigue?

Interestingly, it probably won’t. Although the hypothetical student above will feel bad about his B college grades in light of his sister getting As, not all upward comparisons are the same. For example, upward comparisons to close others on important dimensions tend to hurt (e.g., sibling rivalries), but comparisons to distant others on dimensions that don’t align with our own skills directly tend not to hurt. In fact, we can bask in the glow of their success, their beauty, and their story by associating ourselves with them.”

It is only when humanity becomes conscious of the extent to which they have become slaves in “becoming happy” that there is any hope of regaining liberty over the technology which has come to dominate them (Ellul, Philosophy of Technology, 96).

“Humanity must do away with the myth that technology possesses ‘sacred character.’ For example, when humans label technology as their instrument to freedom, a means of “historical destiny,” or execution of a divine vocation. All such constructions have the result of glorify and sanctifying technology and of putting the human being at the disposal of some indisputable historical law or other. Technology is not solely an ensemble of material elements, but that which gives meaning and value to life, allowing humanity not only to live but to live well. The only way to master technology is to ‘desacralization’ and ‘deideologization’; that is, humanity must realize that technology is nothing more than a complexity of material objects, procedures, and combinations, which have as their sole result a modicum of comfort, hygene, and ease. Humanity must realize that technological progress is not humanity’s supreme adventure, but a commonplace fabrication of certain objects. As long as we worship technology, there is no chance of in mastering it” (Ellul, Philosophy of Technology, 96).

“Humanity must maintain a certain detachment and independence with respect to technology. This presents a difficult task, but at the very least, humanity must be able to question his or her use of technical goods, able to refuse them, and force them to submit to determining factors other than the technical or spiritual. As long as humanity does not learn to use technical objects in the right way and evaluate his or her relationship to technology, humanity will remain slaves of the technological realm” (Ellul, Philosophy of Technology, 96).

While I do not agree with Stark’s worldview, I do think that he successfully isolates multitudinous problems with Paul Copan’s reasoning. Click here to read the rather lengthly review.

Feminism strives to undue women’s subordination and oppression. Despite many of Plato’s negative comments regarding women, he is one of the first feminists because he claimed that some women may be legislatures and kings of the society (I am working on getting this reference and will insert it later).

Mary Wollstonecraft (liberal feminist) claims that men and women are equal, so women should be given the same opportunities of men. What makes women equal to men is their capacity for reasoning.

Dualism: reason vs. emotion, mind vs. body, higher vs. lower reason, the community/political space vs. the family. Typically men associate with the first categories and the women with the latter (e.g. men equate with reason and women with emotion). Women have the characteristics ascribed to them (emotional, dumb, manipulative, ect..) because they have been prevented from developing skills (e.g. lacking education, property, power, ect…) and trained to pursue marriage as the only way to sustain a living. Women’s virtues are supposed to be: humility, kindness, and nurturing. But in fact, women also have a whole set of vices due to their socialization: vanity, manipulation, flirtatiousness, shallowness, competitiveness with other women, & infant-level emotional maturity. Wollstonecraft (hereafter, W): these are not innate characteristics that are socialized.

Some virtues are gender linked: Virtues tied to their sex leads to gender traits (e.g. women are caring), then leads to social roles (women are mothers and wives). For men, social roles equate with occupation. Gender traits align with: strength, rationality, leadership, ect… If men aren’t properly masculine, they will be ridiculed. If a woman begins to act too masculine, she gets criticized as well (e.g. Hillary Clinton). These virtues and vices are socialized. Wollstonecraft proposes that since women possess rationality, they can share equality with men.

The same behavior or personality trait in women is a virtue, but in man, it’s a vice. Traits can be valued in different ways depending on who has the power in determining the role of traits. Out virtues and vices are in some sense gender marked. The same trait can be given a positive or a negative valiance.

What does Nietzsche have to do with feminism? (Genealogy of Morals)

Nietzsche tells story about moral values and how they came into being. Our moral virtues are not given or fixed for all time. They have a history. If we tell this history, we may be freed up to ask ourselves the question. Are these the values we want? Are our moral values, values that serve us? What is the value of our moral values? Once we recognize there’s a history of our values there’s evidence that they are created. It opens the possibility to ask ourselves, what do we want?

He tells a story about an early proto-morality (i.e. Noble morality: the morality of the strong). The nobles do the naming. They name themselves first. What are the traits? The traits they associate to themselves are: power, strength, free flowing, physicality, joy, not deep thinkers, people of action, self-affirming. The Nobles distinguish themselves from the plebians (commoners) who are the meek, the weak, the unimportant, an afterthought (Nietzsche likes these folks). However, the people on the bottom are oppressed and want to revolt, but cannot because they do not have the organization or resources. Neitzsche says (section 10 of GOM) that the slave revolt in the form of morality, which originates in resentment. Nietzsche equates plebians with Jews because the oppressed get clever. To gain power, the oppressed tell the oppressors that they will burn in hell. This makes the weak feel good about themselves. Furthermore, Nietzsche says that the Plebs reversed the values through their resentment; that is, they take the weak traits and make them good. At this point, the oppressed notify the dominant group that they are cruel, unjust, tyrants, arrogant. This gives the oppressed power and eases their depressed situation. Nietzsche’s contribution to the oppressed is the power of naming, re-naming, and re-valuing is from the creative power of humanity and does lead to liberation.

W wants to provide women an education so that females can reason too. What does this all have to do with feminism? The power of naming is essential to transforming society. What Nietzsche saw is what feminists can appropriate.

Ex. The “nigger” word was turned into a positive and gave blacks power. The term “black is beautiful” in the 60’s was created to combat the standard of beauty that focused on white women. “Faggot” was very derogatory and now gay activists are reclaiming it. Rappers say “Pimp” today to mean that they have many things and an elevated social status. They’ve made people “bitches” in gaining money from record sales. However, this term is complicated because black men are reclaiming power at the expense of women.

One of the things that feminists do is to focus on Nietzsche’s insight into renaming/reclaiming their true nature rather than socially contrived identities.
Vernallis: “The capacity to rename our vices as our virtues is part of a libratory strategy and is one that feminism should take seriously.”

Nietzsche: If truth is a women…then what? You desire it, but it eludes you. This idea that women are not truthful given their misleading nature. Truthfulness and women are not valued (ex: the phrase “man of his word” does not equate with women). He’s not a relativist, but Nietzsche offers us this insight on the power of naming, which can be used in a libratory way. But there’s also this questioning about truth.

Nietzsche was surrounded by women who were more liberated for that time (e.g. a he proposed to a well-educated woman and his sisters were also far more educated than most women). How much are just his own views given that he never married, may have had one sexual experience, and lived at home? Humans have the creative power to re-name. Feminists (and other oppressed groups) should use Nietzsche to revalue the world.

Along similar lines, a year earlier, Marx publishes his essay, “On The Jewish Question” (1843), which stands as a corrective to Bruno Bauer’s misguided approach towards human emancipation. Given that Bauer works to answer “the Jewish question” of whether Jews should attain equal rights as Christians within Germany’s Christian political climate and his claim that human emancipation is only possible through the secular state, Marx claims that Bauer’s system preserves alienation. How exactly? Through the preservation of individual rights and private property—later specified as Bourgeois private property in “The Communist Manifesto”). Such separation of private, civil life and public, political life, procures a divided, alienated society.

While both of Marx’s essays (“On The Jewish Question” and “CHP”) condemn the notion that humanity may find freedom from alienation through the critique of ideology or mere philosophical systems (i.e. merely critiquing religion or other ideology), “On The Jewish Question” draws attention to the actual source of alienation (i.e. private property and individual rights) and points to the need to eradicate the division between the private, civil life and the political realm. In addition, Marx points to the correct question to pursue (i.e. how can all of humanity find universal emancipation?), rather than seeking to correct a specific instance of Jewish oppression involving religion because such approach only addresses the symptom of alienation.

This manifestation of ideas in the physical world echo’s in Marx’s admonition to the Proletariat to use “material weapons to fight material weapons.” It is only through this enactment of ideas that humanity may achieve universal emancipation. To further advance the connection between “On The Jewish Question” and “CHP,” Marx’s “Communist Manifesto” (1848) officially calls the Proletariat into action, which completes Marx’s admonition to combine theory with practice. Given this fascinating trajectory of ideas regarding how humans achieve emancipation from oppressive social and political systems, I will explore the similar, but unique ways in which Marx advances his ideas towards this end. In particular, I will primarily focus “On The Jewish Question” and “CHP,” but I will also incorporate Marx’s ideas from “The Communist Manifesto” and the “Theses on Feuerbach.”

Marx and Human Emancipation

Human emancipation lies at the heart of Marx’s philosophical, economic, and political writings. Thus, his project takes aim at eradicating social and political structures that dominate and oppress others. True liberation, according to Marx, involves theoretical insight into oppressive systems, human nature, and the trajectory of human history (Simon, x-xi). However, changes to material conditions must occur in order to establish universal, human emancipation. Why? Because material changes moves humanity beyond a mere ideological critique of its current condition, and instead, works to eliminate systems that produce and sustain alienation. In Marx’s essay, “CHP,” he articulates the reason why ideology fails to deliver humanity from oppression. Primarily, this is due to a false presupposition within Germany’s political context, which points to human consciousness or ideas as the foundation and driving force behind human history and emancipation. Ideas that are not presupposed on material, human existence cannot impact human existence in the actual, physical world. In fact, ideas remain in the mysterious realm of abstraction that cannot actualize anything into practice (Marx, CHP, 33).

Similar to “On the Jewish Question,” Marx’s later work, “CHP,” further articulates the nature and source of alienation that exists due to mere idealistic criticism; of which religion plays a major role as an epiphenomenon of an alienated society. But unlike the Jewish Question essay, Marx further develops ideas as to how ideology manifests in the physical world with the introduction of the Proletariat class and the need for revolution. As a result, Marx believes that like the German political climate, Bauer gets lost in attacking the symptoms of alienation rather than working to alleviate the root cause of alienation (i.e. private property and individual rights).

This misguided, incomplete approach will not only fail to achieve human emancipation, but will also involve the failure to implement theoretical criticism of social and political realms into material force (Marx, CHP, 32). In Marx’s words, Germany’s criticism of social and political conditions remains in the ideological realm alone and thus, “leaves it as a one-sided and stunted character towards actuality. In fact, Germany’s idealism resembles ancient countries that lived in “pre-historic imagination” or “mythology” because Germans live in mere thought or philosophy (Marx, CHP, 33). Persisting in ideology alone ushers in a “partial, merely political emancipation, leaving the pillars of the house standing” (Marx, CHP, 35).  Interestingly, much like his essay “CHP” in his essay, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx criticizes Bauer for taking aim at mere ideology (religion and establishing Jewish rights) and ushers in an incomplete emancipation through the establishment of the secular state.

The secular state leads to incomplete human emancipation due to the fact that religion, individual rights, and private property continue to exist in the civil, private sphere. Thus, it allows structures of alienation to persist such as: private property, individual rights, egoism, and wage labor to persist. As a result of such compartmentalization, humanity remains in partial emancipation; that is, on the one hand, individuals participate in a secular, unified, political community. On the other hand, individuals participate in private, “civil society” that exists as a space where people live out their individual, private life that includes religion.

Such a divided sphere houses incomplete emancipation and comprises of people who, in the civil realm, “treat others as a means, reduces him or herself to a means, and becomes a plaything of alien powers” (Marx, Jewish Question, 9). While Marx does not articulate a clear definition of human emancipation in his essay “On the Jewish Question,” he does have non-alienating ways of being in mind. When humans move forward from political emancipation to a society that promotes species-being (i.e. living in relationships with others that do not promote alienation), human emancipation is complete. As Marx proclaims, “when humanity has recognized and organized its own powers as social powers so that social force is no longer separated from him as political power, only then is human emancipation complete” (Marx, Jewish Question, 21). Another connection that I find intriguing between Marx’s claims here and his essay, “CHP” rests in the idea that he first points out the tendency to focus on the symptoms of alienation (i.e. religion or other form of ideology and political emancipation) in “The Jewish Question.” Then, in “CHP,” Marx moves forward from his critique of incomplete emancipation; that is, after articulating the pernicious nature of religion as a symptom of alienation, he discusses how to establish species being by overcoming structures of alienation (i.e. anything that sustains classes, private property, individual rights, and egoism). Humans create religion because they represent alienated beings that only know how to place their identity in an otherworldly, alien being.

To reach a state that overcomes alienating forces, the Proletariat revolution must occur. Towards this goal, Marx proposes that “the weapon of criticism” (i.e. making changes through material force) provides the only way to establish universal, human emancipation through the Proletariat, which represents a civil class that wears “radical chains” and possesses a “universal character.” Universal character exists because the nature of suffering spreads across all classes. In fact, the Proletariat “does not claim a particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it; a sphere that can invoke no traditional title but only a human title that opposes the presuppositions of the German political system” (Marx, CHP, 38). Put beautifully, “philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, as the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has deeply struck this unsophisticated soil of the people, the German will emancipate themselves to become men” (Marx, CHP, 38). Humanity may reach universal emancipation if material weapons fight material weapons (Marx, CHP, 27).

Continuing this idea of uniting theory and practice, Marx also alludes to this in his “Theses on Feuerbach,” which works to synthesize Hegelian ideology with Feuerbach’s materialism. That is, Hegelian idealism fails to instantiate change because it falls into mysticism, and thus, overlooks material existence and changing physical conditions. To the opposite extreme, Feuerbach’s materialism is overly materialistic and deterministic because it fails to account for “sensuous human activity” that is capable of altering itself and/or its environment. To counter this problem, Marx’s materialism aims to incorporate sensuous human activity (physical existence or sense experience) with material existence that forms “a human society or socialized humanity,” which must occur through “revolutionary practice” (Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 100). Furthermore, this form of materialism that leads to human emancipation establishes a socialized humanity and connects with Marx’s earlier writings. For instance, “On The Jewish Question” critiques the divided human existence created by Bauer’s incomplete emancipation through the establishment of the secular state, which creates a divided social existence (i.e. divided between the private and political realms).

In Marx’s later essay, “CHP,” he critiques Germany’s false presuppositions that rest upon mere ideology, including its failure to fight “material weapons with material weapons” (i.e. to fight oppressive material conditions with action and not mere ideology). In both the Jewish Question and “CHP” as correctives of misguided approaches that fail to recognize “human sensuous existence” in the material realm and thus, fails to achieve universal, human emancipation enacted by the Proletariat revolution. Marx’s theoretical critique reaches physical manifestation in “The Communist Manifesto,” which calls the Proletariat revolution into action (Marx, Communist Manifesto, 186) and ultimately establishes socialism (i.e. the State ruled by workers) and opposes the existence of Bourgeois property (Marx, Communist Manifesto, 170). After this stage, society will reach the heart of Marx’s project with the establishment of Communism. At this point, humanity returns to its free, social, communal existence with no state, class division, private property, or any other alienating systems.

References:

Marx, Karl (1994). “On The Jewish Question” (1843). Published in Lawrence H. Simon (Ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (pp. 1-21). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

Marx, Karl (1994). “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction” (1844). Published in Lawrence H. Simon (Ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (pp. 27-39). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1994). “The Communist Manifesto.” (1848). Published in Lawrence H. Simon (Ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (pp. 157-186). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

Simon, Lawrence (1994). Karl Marx’s Selected Writings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing).

Karl Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” is a critical response to Bruno Bauer–a radical liberal, atheist, and Young Hegelian–who, in response to the question of whether Jews should gain equal rights as Christians, believes that human emancipation rests in the abolition of religion from the political realm to the private, civil sphere.

In response, Marx claims that Bauer poses the wrong question (i.e. whether Jews should be granted the same rights as Christians). The question should not address merely Jewish emancipation, as this is too egotistical, but rather, political emancipation of all humanity. While Marx agrees with Bauer, that religion alienates humans from themselves and others, he believes that Bauer fails to distinguish between political and human emancipation.

Political emancipation does not require the elimination of religion because a secular society affords the freedom to practice religion, hold private property, and create class divisions. This kind of emancipation places religion in the private, civil sphere, and thus, creates a divided life for the individual. On the one hand,  individuals participate in a secular, unified, political community, and on the other hand, individuals participate in private, “civil society” that exists as a space where people live out their individual, private life that includes religion. In Marx’s words, this sphere represents people who “treat others as a means, reduces himself or herself to a means, and becomes a plaything of alien powers.” Given this development, political emancipation does not bring human emancipation to completion. While Marx does not articulate a clear definition of human emancipation in his essay “On the Jewish Question,” he does have non-alienating ways of being in mind. When humans move forward from political emancipation to a society that promotes species-being (i.e. living in relationships with others that does not promote alienation) human emancipation is complete. I believe at this stage, Marx endorses humanity overcoming religion.

Problems:

1) Religion will never be eradicated, even if it is a “defect” of society. It is unrealistic to think that humanity can overcome religion given its historical track record.

2) It is too idealistic to think that humanity is capable of living in a society in which people are capable of constructing and living out a way of life that sustains “species being” (i.e. living in non-alienating relationships with oneself, one’s work, and others. For more on alienation, see Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscript that addresses alienation). Human nature cannot alter itself to the extent that private property, religion, a division between classes, ect….will face elimination. Given the history of humanity, I have not seen a successful community instantiate this political and civil way of life.

3) I know Christians would disagree that their religion procures human alienation, but I wonder how humans can find their true identity in Christ and how this answers the meaning of life.

4) If Marx’s system is too idealistic, then what is the best political and civil system for society? Free market capitalism? A modified socialism that provides for basic needs (i.e. healthcare, protection via police/military, access to food, shelter, clothing, jobs, care for the disabled, ect…) yet affords space for free market capitalism? Or something else?

J.P. Moreland is a distinguished professor of philosophy at Biola University. He is most notable for his defense of Christian theism and his rejection of naturalism as a plausible worldview. One of his most recent books, Consciousness and the Existence of God argues that finite, irreducible consciousness provides evidence for the existence of God. Throughout his book, Moreland critiques rival physicalists such as, John Searle’s “contingent correlation,” Timothy O’Connor’s “emergent necessitation,” Colin McGinn’s “mysterian naturalism,” David Skrbina’s “panpsychism,” and Philip Clayton’s “pluralistic emergentist monism.” According to Moreland, all of these positions should be rejected in favor of the “argument from consciousness” for theism. This paper will illustrate Moreland’s argument from consciousness (hereafter, AC) defended in chapter two, of which I will offer a critique. Included in my critique, I will attempt to demonstrate how I think Moreland’s argument from consciousness is equally, if not more incomplete as reductive physicalist accounts.

Prior to offering a deductive argument for the argument from AC, Moreland states that physicalists must admit that consciousness is a brute, unexplainable fact (Moreland, 38). The main agenda of this chapter and book is to argue that all naturalists should adopt reductive physicalism because naturalism cannot accommodate any immaterial properties, emergent or not. Furthermore, Moreland argues that consciousness is “ontologically basic” for theism, whereas under naturalism, consciousness requires an explanation, whereas for theism, consciousness does not warrant an explanation given the fact that God and consciousness share immaterial properties.

For instance, according to AC, theistic metaphysics does account for consciousness with the imposition of God’s un-embodied mind whereas a naturalist account leads to a category mistake between material and immaterial properties. Furthermore, Moreland holds the view that mental states find explanation from a first person view, but not from a third-person point of view. For example, scientist can explain what it might be like for a lion to chase down its prey, but the scientist would never experience hunting from the lion’s perspective.

One of Moreland’s central claims asserts that naturalists should adopt strong physiclaism in order to avoid inconsistency, category mistakes, and question begging assertions. Since physicalism cannot account for consciousness or first-person experience of the world, then all naturalists/physicalists need to remain consistent and adopt strong physicalism. Given naturalism’s inability to account for consciousness, Moreland offers the following argument, which he terms the argument from consciousness:

1)    “Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.

2)    Specific mental event types are regularly correlated with specific physical event types.

3)    There is an explanation for these correlations.

4)    Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.

5)    The explanation for these correlations is either a personal or natural scientific explanation.

6)    The explanation is not a natural scientific one.

7)    Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.

8)    If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.

9)    Therefore, the explanation is theistic” (Moreland, 37).

In chapter two Moreland does not completely defend premises (3) and (6) because he spends the rest of the book explaining these points. However, my critique will cover premises (1) and (2). The critique of these premises provides sufficient evidence that AC is equally, if not more incomplete as naturalism.

Regarding premise (1), he admits that the truth of premise one is an assumption and then immediately claims that property dualism yields evidence against naturalism, and rather, supports theism. Property dualists argue that mental states are not physical since they possess the following six features that characterize mental states, but no physical states as follows:

a)     “There is a raw qualitative feel or ‘what it is like’ to a mental state such as pain.

b)    At least many mental states have intentionality—oftness or aboutness—directed towards an object.

c)     Mental states exhibit certain epistemic features (direct access, private access, first-person epistemic authority, are expressed in intentional contexts, self-reflexivity associated with “I”) that could not be the case if they were physical.

d)    They require a subjective ontology—namely, mental states are necessarily owned by the first-person, unified, sentient subjects who have them.

e)     Mental states fail to have crucial features (e.g. spatial extension, location) that characterize physical states and, in general, cannot be described using physical language.

f)     Libertarian free acts exemplify active power and not passive liability” (Moreland, 38).

Critique of Moreland’s Argument from Consciousness

Premise (1) states, “Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.” To justify this claim, Moreland admits this is an assumption and draws attention to property dualism, which claims that the mental is completely dependent upon physical properties and does not interact with the physical brain. Furthermore, he points to property dualism in order to support his first premise that mental states are non-physical entities, but ignores the fact that property dualists believe that the mental relies on the physical for its existence. The strongest evidence for the mental takes root in the physical brain and the evolutionary history of consciousness.[1]

While Moreland accuses naturalism of begging the question and espousing consciousness as a brute fact, I believe he is equally as guilty of begging the question with his defense of substance dualism. In attempt to completely separate the physical with the non-physical, Moreland ignores the fact that we have yet to account for the mind without physical embodiment. At the conclusion of chapter two, Moreland states, “perhaps our conclusion that a naturalist ought to be a strong physicalist is premature. Maybe there are adequate naturalist accounts of the mental” (Moreland, 51). This is inconsistent with his first premise and its justification because to admit that physical accounts may explain consciousness, while at the same time, claiming that physicalism is false is misleading.

While I agree that the first-person account remains unexplained[2], the distinction between mental and physical states does not follow. Simply because a physicalist cannot fully account for first person experience and intentionality, this does not mean that theism automatically provides an account of consciousness. Even if one proposes that theism provides the “best explanation” of consciousness, this abduction equates with an argument from ignorance. In fact, physical explanations of the mental states offer evidence whereas zero evidence rests in favor of mental causation of physical states.

I am not opposed to one working towards an account for consciousness with theism or Berkeley’s idealism, although, the evidence remains inconclusive as to how an immaterial property such as God would account for the mind. Furthermore, it remains unclear as to how a theistic proposal yields any new information about how consciousness arose. The AC runs into the same dogmatic assertion that the strong physicalists encounter because both strict physicalism and theism remain incomplete or unable to account for consciousness. Theism faces the problem of causal closure, which illustrates the lack of evidence in favor of the mind causing alterations in the physical. In fact, I would argue that theism remains even more incomplete than strong physicalism because no observable or testable evidence for the existence of an immaterial, personal agent who is responsible for consciousness exists.

In support of premise (2), Moreland claims that physicalist’s typically endorse the causal theory, however, he argues that physicalists cannot account for the “origin, regularity, and precise nature of these correlations, since these are what constitute a causal theory of action in the first place. If an event causal theory of action presupposes mental states, then it will remain important to explain the existence, regularity, and precise nature of those mental states unless a divine causal agency of action is used” (Moreland, 47). While I agree with Thomas Nagel that physicalism is incomplete, this does not mean that a theistic explanation automatically wins over physicalism or even qualifies as a plausible explanation.

I believe Nagel is correct in not positing alternatives, but instead merely states that reductive physicalism is incomplete. When one inserts theism or panpsychist theories that remain even more speculative than reductive physicalism, this presents an argument from ignorance and god of the gaps fallacy. In fact, I think premise (2) provides more support for physicalism than theism because if some or even many mental states can be traced to particular physical states, then this provides more explanatory power than theism. Theism begs more questions and lacks empirical verification. While I realize that simply because something cannot be empirically verified does not mean it is true or false, however, I think testable evidence provides stronger explanations than one’s without testable evidence.

Moreland points to Thomas Nagel’s argument that natural scientific explanation of consciousness is inadequate and criticizes him for not considering theism as a plausible explanation of the mental. Moreland believes that, “Nagel expresses a view about freedom and personal explanation according to which libertarian freedom is what we take ourselves to have, yet we cannot have it, given naturalism and the external, third-person scientific point of view” (Moreland, 49). My objection to Moreland here points to the fact that such certainty in libertarian freewill remains ungrounded. For instance, even within the confines of Christian theology, strong Calvinists claim that God determines who is “saved” and determines every event that occurs in the world. The argument from consciousness fails to establish how libertarian freedom follows from theism or a personal agent. Simply because “we take ourselves to have libertarian freedom,” as Moreland claims, in no way indicates that we actually possess freedom.

Moreover, how do we know that humanity cannot have any freedom if naturalism is true? Certainly, we know aspects of life are determined such as, what family we are born into, our genetic makeup, what gender we are, ect…however, whether all events in human life are determined, partially-determined, or not determined is beyond knowledge. If naturalism is true, this does not automatically mean that all natural events are determined. This is not the most troubling claim Moreland makes. The most puzzling claim he make is that a “personal explanation need not offer a mechanism, but instead, accounts for personal explanation by describing the relevant person, his intentions, the basic power exercised, and offer a description of the action plan” (Moreland, 50). Simply because a non-physical agent possesses the same ontology as a non-physical mental state does not mean this is the best explanation or even a plausible explanation.

However, if a supernatural being exists and interacts with physical reality identifiable ways, then scientific inquiry can reveal a great deal about the realm of that supernatural reality. Those who rely on these types of methods often arrive at contradictory conclusions about the nature of the supernatural. If the supernatural world or personal agent exists, it does not appear that science or any kind of inquiry has yet to discover reliable means for knowledge about such an entity. While incomplete, physicalism at least offers more explanatory power via empirical observation (i.e. neuroscience) in regards to the existence of mental states given that mental states depend upon physical states. Whereas theism or any kind of supernatural explanation begs the question and argues from ignorance more than any other claim because no reliable, empirical evidence supports any certain supernatural or theistic claim in regards to consciousness; or at least I have yet to find one.

Reference:

Moreland, J.P. Consciousness and the Existence of God (New York, NY: Routledge Publishers, 2008).

A central objection to Putnam’s meaning externalism refers to Jerry Fodor’s methodological solipsism stance towards meaning. The central question addresses the issue of whether an individual on earth and another individual on twin earth possess the same belief about the composition of water (i.e. whether water is H2O or XYZ). Putnam puts forth the externalist view and denies that the earthling and twin earthling have the same psychological state and thus, meaning lies external to the individual. To the contrary, Fodor presents a meaning internalist view, which indicates that the earthling and twin earthling possess the same psychological state; that the contents of their beliefs derives from their head and not from the external world (Fodor, “Methodological Solipsism,” 489).

Furthermore, Fodor’s computational approach proposes that ideas equate with mental representations; to have an idea consists in relating to an idea (Fodor, 489). For example, if I believe that I need to follow a certain exercise regimen to complete a marathon, Fodor’s opaque taxonomy view relates a belief (that I need to exercise) with a mental representation that includes specified content (i.e. that I need to exercise in order to complete a marathon). The content of mental representations is symbolic as it contains both semantic and syntactic properties (Fodor, 490). When individuals follow chains of reasoning they carrying out computational calculations of syntactic properties that refer to their mental representations (Fodor, 487). Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario fails to address computational properties that refer to mental representations because according to Fodor ideas stand for symbols that form a system of language (Fodor, 487). If Fodor is correct, then Putnam has not shown that the earthling and twin earthling differ in psychological states. This is because both the earthling and twin earthling produce content from computational calculations of syntactical properties that refer to water as H20 and XYZ. Meaning generates from within, not from the external world as Putnam contends.

Daniel Dennett in “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and How It Works” argues in favor of “the intentional stance” when it comes to “the nature of belief attribution.” In order to accomplish this task, Dennett merges some elements from two opposing views, known as interpretationism and eliminativism (Dennett, 14-15). Given few adherents to his earlier writings from the 1970’s about the nature of belief as an intentional system, Dennett offers an updated argument that deals with challenging objections. His updated argument further develops the notion that beliefs are “objective phenomenon” that must be interpreted with a “predictive strategy” that demonstrates a successful track record (Dennett, 15). He classifies himself as a small ‘r’ realist given the fact that particular beliefs are relative to the individual and his or her circumstances; but it is an objective fact that it is not possible to identify each individual’s beliefs and desires (Dennett, 28). To support his claim that a “true believer is an intentional system that exhibits predictable behavior, which is detectable by the intentional strategy,” (Dennett, 15), Dennett first articulates how this strategy works and ultimately why it works.

Dennett thinks the interpretationalist and eliminativist positions are both mistaken, so instead, offers an argument in favor of the intentional stance. The interpretationalist position roots beliefs in an individual’s tastes and opinion while the eliminativist attributes belief to a brain state (Dennett, 14). To offer an alternative theory of belief attribution, Dennett puts forth the “intentional stance,” which involves three strategies for the prediction of behavior: the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. Briefly, if one knows the physical consistency of a subject, he or she can predict its behavior using the laws of physics (Dennett, 16). Second, the design stance “assumes that an object has a certain design and predicts that it will behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances” (Dennett, 17). Third, the intentional stance first “treats a subject as a rational agent and then figures out what beliefs the agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose” (Dennett, 17). After this, “you figure out what desires the subject ought to have, on the same considerations, and then predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs” (Dennett, 17).

According to Dennett, common sense will reveal what “the agent ought to do” or “what you predict the agent will do,” (Dennett, 17). As long as the actions of a subject offer predictive power to future actions and the predictive strategy offers a successful track record, the intentional strategy or stance often reveals true outcomes. This qualifies a subject as something with intentional beliefs. Even though Dennett concedes that the intentional stance is not always successful, nor does not apply perfectly to all situations, the intentional strategy can “dramatically reduce the number of live options,” such as the many options presented by a move in a game of chess (Dennett, 24).

While I agree that the intentional stance is helpful in the identification of patterns of behavior or actions that illuminate future predictions, however, I am left with questions that move beyond the scope of this essay. Primarily, I wonder whether insentient objects truly have “patterned intentional behavior” or “beliefs” as Dennett claims. I am led to believe that this is not the case given the blockhead challenge to instrumentalism. This example illustrates that my twin who has a microchip instead of a brain has no mental life. As David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson convincingly claim, predicting behavior has more to do with a subject’s mental life than the intentional stance because the contents of one’s previous mental states are included. Instrumentalists do not refer to mental contents of previous mental states, but only to what “node” or physical response occurs (BMJ, 163). There is a significant difference between the automatic door sensor and human behavior regarding the nature of beliefs. The former lacks mental content, while the latter is content-laden with beliefs, memories, desires, intentionality, and awareness. Prior beliefs, memories, and desires do not alter the course of action for a door sensor, while this plays a central role in directing human behavior and belief formation. Because of this difference, instrumentalist accounts fail to account for beliefs of any kind.

References:

1) Dennett, Daniel C. “True Believers: The intentional Strategy and Why it Works.” The Nature of Mind. Ed. David M. Rosenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 339-49.

2) Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F. (1996). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition
(Blackwell).

James Escalante believed that students would rise to the expectations set for them and succeed. Realistically speaking, not every student will succeed because not all will choose to rise to the occasion. However, I do believe that most of the time, students will apply themselves when challenged and supported. How does this work? First of all, great teachers need to help students believe they can learn. This is because many students bring insecurities, false self-narratives, and false cultural narratives to the classroom. For example, the expectations held by teachers and society for students from low SEC backgrounds remain low. This trickles down to how students view themselves and perform. Thus, students will often say, “I will never be good at math,” “I can’t do math,” “I can count change, so I do not need any more math.”

Great teachers challenge students to rise above this level of thinking to a realization of how education will provide a better quality of life for them and their family. While not all students will choose to acknowledge this, I think most will thrive when they understand how education can move them from flipping burgers to running or owning the burger store.

In order to help students believe in themselves and foster a desire to learn, effective teachers do the following: outline clear expectations, push students to think on their own, exhibits that he or she genuinely cares for students (it is amazing what an influential role this plays in the learning process), have strict classroom rules and consequences regarding tardiness and cell phones, and give frequent quizzes and homework. If a student doesn’t do their homework without an excusable reason or acts out during class, have them sit in front facing the class. It is amazing how effective public embarrassment works. When going over the homework, assign the disobedient student the task of writing on the board for the whole class period.

When presenting material, incorporate some humor from time-to-time, asks a lot of questions of the students to cultivate critical thinking, provide personal examples that relate to the material, and help students discover the relevance of the material to the “real world,” Get them to teach the material back, explain it in their own words, have them teach the material to someone not in the class, assign frequent verification assignments that tracks whether they are tracking with the material. This means, frequently assigning an in-class exercise of writing a paragraph about the material. When closing class, recap and have them say back what main topic and concepts were covered.

Lastly, students often fail to see how their actions will impact their future. They only look at the present turn and do not look down the road ahead. For incoming college freshmen, it is imperative that teachers help them shift focus that rests entirely on here and now thinking, to a more balanced approach that incorporates futuristic thinking. When students see why their education matters and perhaps even becomes excited about pursuing a particular career, they will put the time and effort into their course work. Have them tell you why they are here and what they hope to do in the future. If they don’t know, assign for homework a short essay that challenges them to think through these questions.

This is what I have for now. I will post more wisdom for teachers throughout my learning and teaching process.

In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment edited by James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis offers a collection of arguments from prominent theist scholars who offer a critique of Hume’s reasoning against natural theology. This piece provides a comprehensive, thorough critique of David Hume’s arguments against natural theology; except for chapter three, which offers a pro-Humean stance and chapter two, which outlines the most important sections of Hume that relate to natural theology. Part one explains Hume’s thought and begins a critique offered by Keith Yandell and James F. Sennett. Part two offers nine arguments in favor of natural theology. Some of which directly address Hume’s objections, while others present indirect, yet related arguments against Humean thought. Chapter three by, Todd Furman presents the lone pro-Hume account and leaves the reader to decide whether the arguments presented in part two save natural theology from Hume’s critique.

In outline, after introductory remarks, chapter two by Hume scholar, Terence Penelhum presents Hume’s ideas that relate to natural theology, followed by chapter three, which offers a pro-Hume stance. The Humean critique begins with chapter four “On Meaning, Verification and Natural Theology” by, Keith Yandell. In this chapter, Yandell successfully establishes the most significant problems with Hume’s objections to natural theology given the self-refuting nature of verification empiricism and concept empiricism, the problem of other minds, and the problem of psychological states. As for the Ontological Argument (OA), Hume offers the following objection: “whatever we can conceive the existence of, we can conceive the nonexistence of.” Yandell successfully argues that merely because the contrary of a claim could be imagined, this fails to establish the truth or falsity of said claim. However, refutations of the OA after Hume still stand today because while the OA is deductively valid, it is unsound. This is because the OA equivocates on imagined and real properties, and thus, the OA’s form could deductively prove the existence of unicorns and other imagined entities.[1] Essentially, the argument for God under the OA reduces to absurdity not merely because one could imagine the nonexistence of God, but because the argument runs successfully for substitution instances that produce the non-existence of God.

As for the Cosmological Argument (CA), Yandell challenges Hume’s skepticism of causal connections given the fact that Hume cannot establish the following claim: “the concept of necessity is a human invention and that nothing in mind-independent reality corresponds to that concept.”[2] While Yandell is correct that Hume’s statement here does not pass his own verification principles, however, Hume’s point mentioned by Todd Furman still stands; that the theist commits the evidence error by offering evidence that is “categorically inappropriate for the desired conclusion.” The move from a necessary cause to the necessary cause equating with God as the only necessary cause is a rather hasty assertion. Nevertheless, the CA does argue convincingly for a necessary cause of the universe, but the conclusion cannot specify any particular form of theism or naturalistic origin. Additional arguments would need to be employed to establish a case for a particular first event or agent.

The CA does establish that something caused the universe to exist. Although, I think Yandell moves beyond what the CA supports with the assertion “generic monotheism” is the result. One reason points to his reference to Occam’s Razor without mention of other candidates such as polytheism or naturalistic explanations. To employ Occam’s Razor in support monotheism over polytheism remains problematic because Occam’s Razor indicates that naturalism is preferable to monotheism; even more so over polytheism. Nonetheless, Yandell successfully establishes that Humean thought does not demolish the CA and I would add that vibrant philosophical discussions continue today regarding Cosmological Arguments.

Chapter five, “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project” by James F. Sennett offers a challenge to what he calls “Hume’s stopper,” which means that even if arguments establish a being or beings who created the world, this does not necessarily entail the God of theism (omniscient, omnipotent, all loving, ect…). A helpful footnote that includes comments from Todd Furman on the notion of “Hume’s stopper” that Hume never intended to stop anything, but instead, Hume examines claims that the arguments can and cannot support. While Hume and Todd Furman are skeptical of theism, neither upholds that a defense of theism remains impossible. Sennett clarifies that natural theology is not necessarily an argument for theism; natural theology argues for a much more modest claim; “that a being (or beings) with a given characteristic exists (or has existed).”[3]

To challenge Hume’s stopper, Sennett proposes two different levels of evaluation apply to arguments. One level applies how well an argument runs according to deductive and inductive logic, while on the other hand, the alethic evaluation refers to “an argument that can be evaluated as an aid in discovering truth concerning a question in focus.”[4] He likens alethic reasoning to playing chess and analyzing the best possible move given the evidence at hand. In an analogous manner, when analyzing competing gods given the evidence, alethic reasoning demonstrates a potential best candidate for an explanation. However, rather than emphasizing analogous reasoning to support alethic reasoning, I think further development of abductive reasoning or inference to the best explanation would strengthen the argument. I was left wondering what qualifies as a successful alethic evaluation.

Secondly, I would also recommend avoiding grand, sweeping statements that asserts theism’s “long history of weathering much scrutiny” as this closely resembles the New Atheist’s dogmatic claims that naturalism has endured the same test and offers the strongest evidence. However, refreshingly, Sennett is careful with alethic evaluation given the claim that other religious options or even atheism are plausible candidates. All he is illustrating here points to the fact that theism is not an irrational option, and rightfully so in my opinion.

While Sennett offers reasons why he favors a theistic God, it is far from clear that a personal polytheistic God does not exist. While I think Sennett’s mention of the design argument and arguments from W.L. Craig and J.P. Moreland regarding a personal God adds to his case for theism; although, a lot more work needs to be done to establish this project. Overall, I think Sennett offers a successful argument that supports natural theology as a reasonable explanation from logical and alethic reasoning given that the latter includes support from abductive reasoning and design arguments.

Chapter six, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” by, Douglas Groothuis offers evidence in favor of a causally necessary being (CNB) who is singular and personal. He works to establish this case given the vertical and horizontal versions of the Cosmological Argument (CA). Groothuis takes issue with those who undermine what the CA rationally supports and thus, maintains the ghost of Hume’s stopper.[5] The case for a singular, personal, causally necessary being begins with a critical engagement with Dallas Willard’s view that the CA justifies one or more necessary beings that may or may not be personal. If one were to merely analyze the CA’s form and not its soundness, than Willard’s view would be correct. However, when evaluating for soundness, Groothuis’ assessment provides a solid challenge to Willard’s conclusions.

Since I already covered the issues with utilizing Occam’s Razor to establish monotheism over polytheism, I will move on to the mention of Swinburne’s objection to polytheism. Swinburne asserts that the unity observed in the world, as we know it, does not seem to fit the description of many designers since multiple designers would most probably lead to more disunity. However, while this world does reflect order, given Swinburne’s comments, I think a case could be made that personal polytheistic gods exist given non-optimality of design and the existence of evil.

Even if monotheism and polytheism remain inconclusive, the strongest case for a personal God occurs when considering the nature of impersonal beings. Groothuis argues that agency requires a will, understanding, and the power to bring about one’s will. An impersonal being does not cohere with the design and moral arguments, which support personal agency over impersonal agency. [6] Furthermore, since a contingent universe implies a causally necessary being, a personal being provides a better explanation.[7] The rest of the chapter interacts with a case for God’s omnipotence, which is well argued for. If a CNB knows how to bring the universe into existence from nothing, then it easily follows that the CNB is also omniscient.[8]

While I think this chapter establishes a causally necessary being or beings that possess omniscience and omnipotence given the interaction with Stephen T. Davis, I do not think the God of standard theism necessarily follows. Even if a CNB creates ex nihilo, is omniscient and omnipotent, this does not necessarily mean that the rest of the standard theistic characteristics apply.

The last section on Divine Persistence and the Cosmological Argument addresses Dallas Willard’s claim that according to the CA, it does not demonstrate that the uncaused being or beings who created the universe still exist.[9] The strongest claim offered against this concern of Willard’s points to the fact that if the CNB ceased to exist, the universe would cease to exist since it perpetually remains contingent on the existence of the CNB. “The existence of the CNB and the universe are metaphysically asymmetrical. Since the contingent cosmos continues to exist, we know that the CNB continues to exist.”[10] While I think that the horizontal and vertical versions of the CA may establish the existence of a CNB, I am not sure that simply because the finite world—as we know it—continues to exist, that we can necessarily infer that the CNB still exists. Arguments from non-optimality in design and evil could support the notion of a dying god or a deistic god. Overall, Groothuis’ chapter bodes well for an omniscient, omnipotent, CNB. While I think objections from evil and non-optimal design keep skepticism alive, they do not cancel out the forceful arguments for natural theology.

Chapter seven, “Hume and the Kalam Cosmological Argument” by, Garrett J. DeWeese and Joshua Rasmussen discuss the Kalam (KCA), explanatory principles of causality, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), and “Hume’s stopper.” To support the KCA, DeWeese and Rasmussen appeal to general relativity, big bang cosmology, and the expansion of the universe to demonstrate premise 1 that the universe began to exist. They reference Wilkinson’s Microwave Anisopotropy Probe (WMAP) to assert that the universe is 13.7 billion years old, is finite, and thus, had a beginning. However, the notion that the universe is finite and had a beginning remains inconclusive. In fact, WMAP does support a spatially infinite universe.[11] General relativity allows for two types of models of space – models where space is finite in extent, and models where space is infinite in extent. The mainstream view of contemporary cosmologists is that the evidence suggests that space is infinite.[12]

DeWeese and Rasmussen offer a thorough discussion of efficient causation and touches upon A-theory and B-theory of time that leads into interaction with William Rowe’s objection to the premise “whatever changes has a cause.” They also interact briefly and effectively with Wes Morriston’s skepticism over the claim “whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.” In addition, DeWeese and Rasmussen mention Quentin Smith, who I think offers the most probable claim, thinks that the first state of the universe was a timeless state from which the first temporal state emerged.

W.L. Craig does not think that a timeless physical cause is not sufficient for a temporal effect. However, I do not see any solid justification for this and I think the authors of this chapter needed to expand on this point to effectively counter Quentin Smith. However, DeWeese and Rasummsen do recognize the gap between a demonstration that the universe has a finite past and showing that the universe began to exist.[13] They believe the principle of sufficient reason bridges this gap, which is a plausible approach to avoiding Hume’s Stopper and supports their argument that an omnipotent free agent was the first cause of the universe.

Chapter eight, “Giving The Devil His Due” by, James D. Madden offers a discussion of the classical (CO) and modern (MTA) versions of the teleological argument and concludes that the modern version (MTA) survives Hume’s criticism. To defend the modern teleological argument, Madden employs modern arguments for intelligent design (ID) by Michael Behe and also interacts with the non-optimality of design objection. To answer non-optimal design objections, Madden makes sure the reader knows that the MTA is only part of the cumulative case for God and does not contribute to his omnipotence and omnipresence.

However, Madden offers a challenge to the skeptic to account for how suffering in the world would be different if theism were true and concludes that it is unclear what the skeptic expects the world to look like if God existed. I think a mention of skeptical theism would prove helpful in subverting Humean objections. Simply because evil or non-optimal design exists, this does not necessarily mean that the God of theism does not exist. While this does provide justification for pause for a full endorsement of the God of theism, it does not cancel out the God of theism.

Chapter nine,  “Hume, Fine-Tuning and ‘Who Designed the Designer?’ objection” by, Robin Collins delivers thorough and convincing arguments against the common atheistic claim that theists must account for who made God. Inspired by Rudolf Carnap’s “increase in firmness principle,” Collins employs the “likelihood principle” or epistemic probability in conjunction with the Bayes’s theorem. Given probabilistic reasoning, design arguments fair better than atheistic claims. When face with the problem of evil objection, I found Collin’s response most accurate; that Fine-Tuning arguments would still be true given a morally apathetic deity. However, Collins thinks that probabilistic reasoning would produce a perfectly good being over a morally apathetic being, [14] but I do not see any justification for this claim in this chapter.

As for “Who Designed the Designer?” objection, Collins does a fine job demonstrating the ad hoc nature of this inquiry. The design argument only requires that fine-tuning demonstrate more probability over atheistic claims. Even if the designer is equivalent or more complex than our world as we know it, fine-tuning would still give better reasons for theism over atheistic hypothesis.[15] Collins offers several additional reasons in favor of design and fine-tuning that are worth engaging.

The remaining chapters in the book deal with Hume’s thought as it relates to the following: “Hume and The Moral Argument” by, Paul Copan; “Experiential Evidence and Belief in God” by, Keith Yandell; “The Argument from Reason and Hume’s Legacy” by, Victor Reppert; “Hume and the Argument From Consciousness” by J.P. Moreland; and “Hume and A Cumulative Case Argument” by, R. Douglas Geivett. While I would not assert that this book necessarily establishes the God of theism, however, it does accomplish its main task and thesis: “natural theology is alive and well in contemporary philosophy; the supposed Humean refutation of the enterprise is a myth whose exposure is long overdue.”[16] I think the rigorous critique of Humean thought in this forceful collection of arguments is accessible to those who do not possess training in philosophy. Yet, this volume will prove intellectually satisfying for the seasoned philosopher and apologist. However, some background in logic and philosophy of mind would bode well for the reader in chapters seven, eleven, and thirteen. Nevertheless, Christians and non-Christians should engage with the arguments put forth in this book as it offers the following: a fair representation of Hume’s arguments, offers the limits and strengths of natural theology, and works to challenge Humean dogmatism, which dominates secular academia today.

[2] Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, 165 in James F. Sennett, “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005).

[3] James F. Sennett, “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 85

[4] James F. Sennett, “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 88

[5] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 89

[6] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 111.

[7] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 113.

[8] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 118

[9] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 119

[10] Douglas Groothuis, “Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 121

[11] Referenced in Bradley Monton’s paper, “Design Inference in an Infinite Universe,” see C. L. Bennett, et al. (2003), “First-year Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Observations: Preliminary Maps and Basic Results,” Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series 148: 1-27, and D. N. Spergel, et al. (2003), “First-year Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Observations: Determination of Cosmological Parameters,” Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series 148: 175-94.

[12] Bradley Monton, “Design Inference in an Infinite Universe” in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion Vol. 2, 2010.

[13] DeWeese and Rasmussen, , “Hume and the Kalam Cosmological Argument” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 139.

[14] Robin Collins,“Hume, Fine-Tuning and ‘Who Designed the Designer?’ objection” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 186.

[15] Robin Collins,“Hume, Fine-Tuning and ‘Who Designed the Designer?’ objection” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 189.

[16] James F. Sennett & Douglas Groothuis, “Hume’s Legacy and Natural Theology” in James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 15.

This video is right on the money when it comes to what motivates us at work and at home. What do you think?

Norman Finkelstein:

“The first Europeans came to America with rifles in their hands with the intention of displacing and dispossessing the indigenous population. That is why they needed a rifle. Most Americans today at least acknowledge the fact that what was done to the indigenous population of North America was wrong. It is exactly for the same reason that Jews from eastern Europe came to Palestine with a Bible and a rifle in their hands because their intention was not to live peacefully with the indigenous population, but to displace and dispossess it in order to create a Jewish state in an area that was overwhelmingly Arab. Now, there are possibilities for Israel to live at peace with what was or what remains of the indigenous population, but unfortunately Israel is unwilling to resolve the conflict in cooperation with international law that would allow for some kind of co-existence.”

Later in the interview, Finkelstein asks a great question that Gissen avoided:

“Dr. Raanan Gissen (Israeli analyst and consultant specializing in the Israel-Arab conflict), if I came to your home with a Bible in hand and said according to my Bible my family lived here approximately 3000 years ago would you pack up your bags and leave?”

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, now, therefore, the general assembly proclaims.

This Universal Declaration of Human Rights

As a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article I

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)

Adopted on December 10, 1948
by the General Assembly of the United Nations (without dissent)

This excerpt below is from an interview by the Al-Ahram Weekly.

Could I ask you for a statement on Israel’s attack on the Freedom Flotilla this week while it was in international waters on its way to Gaza?

Hijacking boats in international waters and killing passengers is, of course, a serious crime. The editors of the London Guardian are quite right to say that “If an armed group of Somali pirates had yesterday boarded six vessels on the high seas, killing at least 10 passengers and injuring many more, a NATO taskforce would today be heading for the Somali coast.”

It is worth bearing in mind that the crime is nothing new. For decades, Israel has been hijacking boats in international waters between Cyprus and Lebanon, killing or kidnapping passengers, sometimes bringing them to prisons in Israel including secret prison/torture chambers, sometimes holding them as hostages for many years. Israel assumes that it can carry out such crimes with impunity because the US tolerates them and Europe generally follows the US lead.

Much the same is true of Israel’s pretext for its latest crime: that the Freedom Flotilla was bringing materials that could be used for bunkers for rockets. Putting aside the absurdity, if Israel were interested in stopping Hamas rockets it knows exactly how to proceed: accept Hamas offers for a cease-fire. In June 2008, Israel and Hamas reached a cease- fire agreement. The Israeli government formally acknowledges that until Israel broke the agreement on November 4, invading Gaza and killing half a dozen Hamas activists, Hamas did not fire a single rocket.

Hamas offered to renew the cease-fire. The Israeli cabinet considered the offer and rejected it, preferring to launch its murderous and destructive Operation Cast Lead on December 27. Evidently, there is no justification for the use of force “in self-defense” unless peaceful means have been exhausted. In this case they were not even tried, although — or perhaps because — there was every reason to suppose that they would succeed. Operation Cast Lead is therefore sheer criminal aggression, with no credible pretext, and the same is true of Israel’s current resort to force.

The siege of Gaza itself does not have the slightest credible pretext. It was imposed by the US and Israel in January 2006 to punish Palestinians because they voted “the wrong way” in a free election, and it was sharply intensified in July 2007 when Hamas blocked a US-Israeli attempt to overthrow the elected government in a military coup, installing Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan. The siege is savage and cruel, designed to keep the caged animals barely alive so as to fend off international protest, but hardly more than that. It is the latest stage of long-standing Israeli plans, backed by the US, to separate Gaza from the West Bank.

These are only the bare outlines of very ugly policies.

1) Finkelstein’s stance on the Israel and Palestinian conflict.

2) Comments from an adamant opponent, Alan Dershowitz regarding the Middle East conflict and includes a partial response to some of Finkelstein’s complaints regarding his book, “The Case for Israel.” Dershowitz claims that “Finkelstein speaks for no one but himself and for a handful of people who have hatred for America.”

3) Addresses DePaul University’s controversial decision to deny Finkelstein tenure.

4) Illustrates what I think is a key ingredient to ending war, destruction, and bloodshed, which Finkelstein demonstrates with a visit to Palestinian refugee camps in March 2008. After his interaction with Palestinian refugees, the documentary interviews a young Palestinian man who said, “Norman has enlightened the Palestinian people. We have forgotten some things. We are so concentrated on fighting Israel, but Norman uses diplomacy, and we’ve forgotten that way. He gave me a different idea about Jews. Now I know that not all Jews are Zionists. Not all Jews have the same goal: killing the Arabs, among other things. That’s the idea he gave me.” I encourage Americans and Israelis to better understand Palestinians and move beyond massive generalizations pertaining to this people group that persists today.

5) The documentary also includes the question, “Why is Finkelstein labeled a “Radical?” Finkelstein says that a radical is qualitatively more than the usual discontent a person feels with the world. He sees it as radically unfair and therefore, it has to be radically changed. The documentary presents a fair critical stance of Israel that America and the rest of the world must consider. Whatever one concludes regarding the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, Finkelstein and his opponents such as Dershowitz, must be thoughtfully engaged.

Here are some of the points that I resonated with along with some issues I find problematic:

I agree with Finkelstein in that whatever one thinks about the justice or injustice of the state of Israel’s establishment represents a historical question and correctly asserts that the current question at hand presents a political inquiry: “Are the Palestinians entitled to self-determination?” One people group who occupied the land for thousands of years now have the right to statehood in 80% of the land and is being denied self-determination in 20% of their homeland.

Finkelstein states that almost the entire world community believes that the Palestinians should have their right to self-determination over the 20% that remains in dispute. He then highlights the fundamental facts, which point to the reality that the entire world community supports a two-state settlement along the June 1967 boarders, but Israel and the U.S. are opposed to it. While I disagree with the UN’s decision to designate land for Israel after WWII when Palestinians were the occupiers, I do think the best solution proposed so far was the two-state settlement from 1967. Even though this was denied by the U.S. and Israel, I remain somewhat hopeful that a two-state settlement can be reached someday.

Nevertheless, I remain somewhat skeptical of peace between Israel and Palestine because both sides have dehumanized one another to the extent that they cannot reach an agreement until some understanding of one another is reached. If this does not take place, I am less confident than ever that peace could be reached. If this is the case, tragically, the conflict will end with a devastating defeat of one of the nations. This is why the first step must take on efforts to challenge and at least partially deconstruct the dehumanizing labels that each side holds over one another. Please refer back to point #4 above for details.

I agree with Finkelstein in that nations have the fundamental right to defend their land against invasion and from occupiers causing harm. I also think that Israel is unjustified in its violence towards Palestine as well as it’s take-over of Palestinian territory. While I adamantly disagree with Arab politics, religion, and treatment of women, I know enough about philosophy, history, and ethics to realize that no justification exists for Israel’s violence against Palestine or for its occupation of certain territory. While I disagree with Finkelstein’s comment in the documentary that states, “Hezbollah is the hope,” I do agree with the right of Palestinians to use force in defense of its territory.

Certainly, both sides are guilty of atrocious crimes against humanity through acts of terror (i.e. targeting civilians during war) as outlined by several human rights organizations (i.e. Amnesty International and others). However, instead of bickering about which side is more malicious, I urge the world to focus on how to stop such violence and reach a peaceful agreement between Israel and Palestine. As for Dershowitz, I would have like to see more interaction with his views instead of plagiarism complaints. Indeed, I think issues regarding plagiarism should be discussed, but a critique of Dershowitz’s ideas would have more effectively strengthened Finkelstein’s case.

While American Radical does not focus on the religious aspect of the Middle East crisis, and rightfully so, I want to briefly note that referring to a “holy book” hardly justifies harm towards others or serves imperialistic agendas. While I am a Christian, I do not view the Bible as an inerrant, divinely inspired document from the top down, but rather, I view the Bible as a human testimony to a divine revelation. To remain consistent with their worldview, Christians must interpret the whole of Scripture from the ground up. This means that the approach to Scripture and to how one should live is best dictated by a Christocentric hermeneutic. To know how to best live and treat others is revealed in the Gospels. Jesus’ example reflects: love, hope, joy, restoration, peace, patience, justice, shrewdness, critical thinking, and reconciliation. Please read Randal Rauser and C.S. Cowles on genocide in the Old Testament.

I am currently reading Alan Dershowitz, Norman Finkelstein, and others on the Israel and Palestine conflict and may write an MA thesis on the philosophy of conflict, which would incorporate the Middle East Crisis. American Radical is a must see for everyone. Every nation in the world must come together to somehow help Israel and Palestine reach peace or impending destruction and catastrophe looms. On a last note, I admire Finkelstein for his courage, articulate lectures/debates, and careful research. I was glad to hear him say that he urges people to not place him on a pedestal because they will be disappointed. It is refreshing to encounter a scholar who is not looking for fans.

Randal Rauser:

“The Christian apologist who seeks to defend Israel’s ancient history certainly has his work cut out for him. At the very least one would hope that he would begin with a stark assessment of the problem. But such honesty is surprisingly rare. Instead, Christian apologists often engage the issue in a way that serves more to obscure the nature of the problem. Let me provide three examples.

To begin with, apologists often seek to justify the Canaanite genocide and other violent acts by invoking the standards of just war: warfare always brings with it collateral damage in the death of civilians, and so here too. But this tact is deeply misleading for two reasons. First, while just war categorically prohibits the targeting of civilians, Israel entered Canaan with the instruction to kill everything that breathes (Deut. 20:16), women, the elderly, and babies included. Second, a just war can never be offensive (i.e. involve invading another country) which Israel’s invasion of Canaan clearly was.

A second tact is to explain the genocide as a necessary reaction to a very wicked culture. After all, the Canaanites were so debased that they even sacrificed their own children to Molech, a practice which God considers abhorrent (Lev. 18:21; Lev. 20:2; cf. Ez. 2-:31; Ez 23:37).

There are two problems with that response. First, it is far from clear that the appropriate response to a culture that murders some of its children is to kill everyone in the culture, including the children. Second, it is crucial that we understand the cultic context of Israel’s violence. The Israelites considered the Canaanites to be herem, a Hebrew word which refers to things being handed over to God for destruction as a form of offering (see for instance Deut. 20:17 in English rendered as “utterly destroy”). In other words, the Israelites killed the Canaanite children as offerings to Yahweh in retaliation for the Canaanites killing their children as offerings to Molech. To say this is more morally ambiguous than most apologists will admit is a whopping understatement.

One final strategy used by the apologist is to attempt to limit herem killings to the period of Canaanite occupation (c. 1440-1400 BC). But the fact is that we find references to herem killings four hundred years later when Samuel instructs Saul (speaking for God) to kill the Amalekite men, women, children, infants, cattle, sheep, camels and donkeys (1 Sam. 15:3).

There can be little doubt that Christian apologetics has become very sophisticated. Time and again I have seen Christians engage various issues with greater rigor and intellectual integrity than their various opponents and it makes me proud to say this. But the problem of biblical violence is not typically one of those areas. Thus it is time to apply the same honesty, directness, and rigorous exposition here that is the standard in other areas.”

I admire Finkelstein for his intelligence, courage, articulate speech, and is very quick on his feet.

Finkelstein during a Q&A time:

Fast forward this first video to 44 seconds.

Stephanie Philpott-Jones

Heidegger: The Nazi Controversy

In the midst of an economic depression in Germany during the early years of the 1930s the sociopolitical ideology of National Socialism, or Nazism, gradually rose to power. In 1933 this party gained control over the state of Germany, and executed one of the worst atrocities known to mankind: the killing of well over eleven million Jews, homosexuals, elderly, and mentally handicapped citizens of Germany. These senseless killings have been recognized as the Holocaust, or Shoah. Martin Heidegger, arguably the twentieth century’s most illustrious philosopher, supported the Nazi party in its attempt to gain power. His undeniable enthusiasm for this movement has left his audience with more questions about his involvement and its effects on his philosophy, than answers.

This paper will first inquire into whether Heidegger’s involvement with the National Socialism movement stemmed from his philosophical beliefs through a detailed look into his central Nazi writings. Chiefly, pieces from Being and Time, The Self-Assertion of the German University, some of his political works such as Schlageter, and Declaration for Support of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State, and lastly through the posthumous publication of his interview with Der Spiegel, Only a God can Save Us. Secondly, it will look into whether Heidegger accepted responsibility for his participation in assisting the Nazis through his compliance, as seen in some of the aforementioned writings during his position as Rector of the University. Finally, it will examine what his Nazi sympathies mean for his audience, and explore the contentious question of whether it is possible to reconcile his philosophical ideas with his advocacy for Nazism.

It would be beneficial to first give some contextual information regarding Germany’s National Socialists during their rise to power in the 1930s and 40s in order to better understand the ideology that Heidegger supported.

Nazism and War author Richard Bessel best epitomizes Nazism when he states that it “was a manifestation and the culmination of a long-running theme in European history–namely, racism.”[1] As a political ideology Nazism was founded on war, and was a campaign of racism. This is evidenced by the Nazis’ actions both before and during their rise to power. A brief overview of this rise follows; on September 14, 1930 the Nazis received their first success in the Reichstag elections. Two years later, in July, the Nazis had an electoral victory, which made them the largest party in the Reichstag. Less than a year later, on January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler was elected chancellor. Soon after this, obviously racist laws were passed, beginning with the Reichstag Fire Decree on February 23, 1933. This decree was a permanent deferment of basic civil rights; namely the press was limited, and the police were given increased authority. On April 1, 1933 the Nazis boycotted Jewish businesses. Later that month they began to systematically remove Jewish people from the German civil service through the enactment of the Civil Service Law. By April 1933 Hitler’s war had begun, with the obvious objective of, as Hitler himself put it when outlining Basic Guidelines for the Reconstitution on the National Socialist German Workers Party, combating “ the most dreadful enemy of the German people…Jewry and Marxism.”[2] It was on May 1, 1933, after the aforementioned events had taken place, that Heidegger became an official member of the Nazi party, and on May 27 participated in the ceremony that deemed him Rector of the German University.

Written in 1927, several years before the Nazi regime gained control, Being and Time played an instrumental part in influencing Heidegger’s backing of this political movement. Some though, claim this piece is apolitical in nature. [3] However, it should be taken into consideration that the themes originating in this work, such as the concept of placing Dasein into historicity, occur repeatedly in his Nazi writings. Furthermore, an investigation of this work also reveals some of the basic rationale he had for supporting the Nazi movement. For these reasons, Being and Time is worthy of mention.

Heidegger opens up this piece by stating, “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being.’ We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed,”[4] and thereby engages in what later became his central philosophical struggle, ontology. Heidegger, forced to publish this work quickly, sectioned it into two ‘divisions,’ which served to illustrate his idea that any being, or Dasein, is understood within the “horizon” of time. [5] The first division puts down the foundation for the concept of “time as the horizon for being”[6] by way of explaining an every-day Dasein in the context of consciousness.  The second division delves deeper into Dasein, particularly focusing on the events that force Dasein to extract itself from the ordinary world and exist separately, however briefly, from every day events.

Heidegger gives the examination and confrontation of one’s own death as a primary example for how one can transcend the everydayness of Dasein. As Richard Polt elaborates, “the phenomenon of ‘being-towards-death’ that reveals possibility as such, in a sense that cannot be reduced to present actuality.”[7] Meaning that in facing death the individual’s Dasein is not simply reduced to a present reality, which mainly consists of the everyday, and ordinary.  The acceptance of one’s death allows for Dasein to have its own unique potential, which Heidegger later calls ‘authenticity.’ Additionally, each Dasein “is its past, whether explicitly or not.”[8] This is important, as a Dasein will find itself either existing authentically or inauthentically in light of its history. This throws light on Heidegger’s participation in National Socialism. Given that that he understood Dasein as a happening rather than something static, placing it always within historicity, he viewed Dasein as history in the making. If he saw National Socialism as being authenticity for his Dasein, then it makes sense that his inclination was to participate in this movement. To further this idea still, Karl Lowith, a previous student of Heidegger’s, writes of his Nazism, that Heidegger “referred to this ‘potentiality-for-being’ [authenticity] both as a duty and as a ‘destiny’”[9] It is perhaps more apt then, to say that Heidegger viewed himself within the larger context of the Nazi movement, and felt that it was his ‘duty’ to propel the organization, and his Dasein, to put its stamp into history.

The first of several of Heidegger’s Nazi works, The Self-Assertion of the Germany University given on May 27, 1933 marking the commencement of his time as Rector of the University, revealed his overt Nazi sympathies while simultaneously explaining his view of National Socialism as an assertion of Germany’s Dasein. In this piece Heidegger discussed science as “philosophy,”[10] chiefly meaning the philosophy of the Greeks; which focused on what it meant for a self to be. Heidegger united the concerns of the Dasein of the people to the Dasein of the state of Germany in order to compel his audience to understand the significant history that was taking place under rule of the National Socialists. At the end of Self-Assertion he states:

At the moment when faculties and specialties begin to raise the essential and simple questions of their science, both teachers and students are already encompassed by the same final necessities and pressing concerns, inseparable from the being (Dasein) of people and state. [11]

Deconstructing this statement exposes some of Heidegger’s thoughts in supporting the Nazi movement. When Heidegger uses the term science, he means specifically the ‘science’ of ancient Greeks, which is the inquiry into ontology. Ontology for Heidegger, as previously discussed, is what it means to be a self in the context of the world. Dasein, as he calls the self, cannot be completely extracted from the world. Authenticity, the distinctive potentiality for the Dasein, then must exist as a possibility in the world. When Heidegger uses the term ‘essential and simple questions of their science’ what he is really driving at is that each individual will find that their authentic Dasein is inextricably linked to furthering Germany’s significance, specifically upholding the German University and supporting the National Socialists in their quest to see Germany to greatness. In this sense then, the authentic mode of being for the individual is the potential of seeing the German state to prominence, this ‘potential-for-being’ as formerly discussed, is a duty. Thus, from Heidegger’s perspective, it is a duty both for him and those who are also authentic, to support Nazism.

A view into some of Heidegger’s political works from 1933-1934 will advance an understanding of the depth of his emphatic support for the Nazi’s. Schlageter, dated May 26, 1933 was a speech Heidegger gave about Albert Leo Schlageter who was according to Heidegger “a young German hero a decade ago who died the most difficult and the greatest death of all.”[12] This speech was given in order to commemorate that ‘young man,’ but also so that his audience could better understand what authenticity meant. In giving the story of Albert’s death, Heidegger illuminates why service to National Socialism writes the individuals, as well as the state’s Dasein, into history.

Albert was shot on May 26, 1923 for purported actions to undermine the efforts of the French occupation army stationed in Ruhr. Albert was quoted before his death:

“I find some satisfaction in dying. Perhaps I can help through my example.” — “From 1914 until this day, I have sacrificed all my strength and labor, out of love and loyalty, to my German homeland. Where it was in need, I sought to help.” — “Greet my parents, brothers and sisters, relatives, my friends, and my Germany![13]

This statement illustrates Albert’s unwavering loyalty to the German state even in the face of death. This facing death is essential to Hiedegger’s speech, as confrontation of one’s own death is a way for the Dasein to transcend everydayness and become authentic. When Albert states that he finds some ‘satisfaction in dying,’ rather than fearing it, as he might be able to ‘help through [his] example,’ he is authentic. Albert does not shun death, nor look away; instead he accepts it and makes it definitively his. Heidegger touches on this when he says of Albert that he had “an image of the future awakening of the Volk honor and greatness so that he could die believing in this future,”[14] which is what Heidegger would have all Germans do: submit themselves to the cause of the state despite all other factors. Heidegger would have Germans do this as it demonstrates authenticity in its truest and perhaps most challenged form, in a literal and physical confrontation with death. Heidegger understands the importance of Albert’s death, as in his speech he tries to show that not only does Albert transcend his own ordinary Dasein, this transcendence occurs within the larger context of supporting, defending, and furthering the German state.  Heidegger uses Albert’s physical death, and his authenticity during that time, to demonstrate the magnitude of the Nazi movement; implicating that the individuals Dasein is ultimately in accord with the National Socialist ideals.

Another one of Heidegger’s political pieces, Declaration for Support of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State, given on November 11, 1933, again demonstrates Heidegger’s unyielding advocacy for the party. This particular piece illustrates once more Heidegger’s conviction that the Nazi party was history in the making. Heidegger initially addresses his audience with the sentiment of potential greatness:

German Teachers and Comrades! The German people has been summoned by the Fuhrer to vote; the Fuhrer, however, is asking nothing from the people. Rather, he is giving the people the possibility of making, directly the highest free decision of all: whether the entire people wants its own existence [Dasein] or whether is does not want it. Tomorrow the people will choose nothing less than its future.”[15]

In reading this particular passage it becomes evident that Heidegger feels that the German people are being given a choice as to whether they would like to pursue the path laid forth by the Nazi party. Essentially the German people are being offered an opportunity to write Germany, and consequently themselves, into history. Choosing not to do so, is effectively denying authenticity, which is deplorable to Heidegger. He concludes this speech with an affirmation of his allegiance to Hitler as he states “The Fuhrer has awakened this will in the entire people and had welded it into one single resolve.”[16] This assertion does nothing other than hold Hitler in the highest esteem for manifesting the authenticity of the Dasein of many, into one Being that will stamp itself on not only mankind, but time as well.

Although it is important to look at Heidegger’s writings during the time of his Nazi involvement, it would be an injustice to leave it at that. Accordingly, a brief look into his interview with Der Spiegel, Only a God Can Save Us, would be an appropriate attempt to allow Heidegger to explain for himself his involvement and advocacy for the Nazis during the years of 1933 and 1934. This interview was given in 1966, however it was not published until after Heidegger’s death in 1976.

There exists some controversy surrounding the decision to posthumously publish the interview, specifically that the interview was altered by Heidegger himself.  Heidegger and Nazism author, Victor Farias, maintains as much, given that the interview unmistakably avoids the obvious and blunt questions ‘Why Nazism,’ and ‘Why haven’t you repented?’ Instead of addressing these concerns, the interviewer timidly asks about Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis in 1933, then allows him to put the event into “larger context,” and answer the question by stating “…before my rectorship, I was not in any way politically active. In the winter semester of 1932-33, I had a leave of absence, and I spent most of that time at my cabin.”[17] Thus, Heidegger successfully avoided answering the real question of why he became a fervent supporter of Nazism, and why he has so far been remiss in holding himself accountable for his Nazi actions. The underlying message of this statement is that Heidegger is in no way accountable.  To further this apparent lack of responsibility and remorse for his involvement, Heidegger demands that, “his adherence to National Socialism be placed in context of his reflections on the essence of technology fitted to a planetary scale.” [18] To this Farias offers “He [Heidegger] thereby indicated that from the beginning National Socialism was engaged in a correct approach to the problems posed by the uncontrolled mastery of technology.”[19] The Der Spiegel interview exposes the fact that not only was Heidegger unapologetic for his Nazism, but that he continued to support Nazi ideology on some level. It appears that for Heidegger the very real massacre of eleven million people in an act of ethnic cleansing was inconsequential when compared to the idea that National Socialism knew how to address the problem of modern man and technology. What Heidegger either failed to acknowledge, or refused to admit is that the National Socialist movement was never simply an ideology that was devoted to the problem of ‘solving technology.’ Even in its earliest stages its Fuhrer, Hitler, expressed strong feelings of nationalism, and anti-Semitism, thereby making Nazi ideology fundamentally racist. For Heidegger to try and divorce the Nazi party from its ideology of bigotry was a mistake. It was looking at the Nazi party for what Heidegger wanted it to be, rather than what it was.

Given this information the reader is left in a delicate place. The question, in light of the Der Spiegel interview, is not simply one of whether Heidegger supported Nazism. As seen through his position as Rector and his Nazi writings he obviously did. Given Heidegger’s belief in the Nazi movement as the best approach to modern man’s dilemmas, even after having been made aware of the atrocities they committed, the question becomes; how did Heidegger’s closeness to the movement inform his writing? Plainly put, is it possible for Heidegger’s audience to accept his philosophy considering his propinquity to Nazism for the duration of his life?

It has hopefully become evident at this point that Heidegger’s philosophy and political ideology cannot be separated completely. Thus Heidegger’s philosophy cannot in good faith be taken at face value. Consequently, when reading Heidegger it becomes necessary to keep in the back of one’s mind what influences his work, and how that might affect his philosophy.

Heidegger’s central concept, Being in Time, assisted him in first supporting the Nazi movement by giving him the framework from which within he could support Nazi ideology. His pieces in 1933 and 1934, The Self-Assertion of the German University, and his political writings, Schlageter, and Declaration for Support of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State, reveal how he intertwined his philosophy with his political ideas. Finally, his interview Only a God Can Save Us shows his rationalization for participating in the Nazi movement, and confirms his later support for the movement.

In conclusion, Heidegger has unequivocally been hailed as the  “greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.”[20] While dismissing Heidegger’s works completely for his Nazi involvement is almost impossible given his considerable and far reaching impact on philosophy, the reader would do well to keep in mind the rationalization that his pieces, such as Being and Time, allowed him to have. With this in mind, the reader is then in the best position to critically examine Heidegger’s philosophy for him or herself.

Bibliography:

Bessel, Richard. Nazism and War. New York: Modern Chronicles Library Book, 2006.

Farias, Victor. Heidegger and Nazism. Edited by Joseph Marigolds, Tom Rockmore.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.

Heidegger, Martin. Being in Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of

New York Press, 1996.

Heidegger, Martin. Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings. 76, The

German Library. Manfred Stassen. New York: Continuum, 2003.

Heidegger, Martin. “From Only a God Can Save Us.” In The Heidegger Controversy: A

Critical Reader. Edited by Richard Wolin, 91-119. London: MIT Press, 1993.

Heidegger, Martin. “From Political Texts 1933-1934.” In The Heidegger Controversy: A

Critical Reader. Edited by Richard Wolin, 40-60. London: MIT Press, 1933.

Lowith, Karl. “From The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism.” In The

Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. Edited by Richard Wolin, 167-185.

London: MIT Press, 1993.

Polt, Richard. “From Being in Time.” In Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts. Edited by

Bret W. Davis, 69-81. Durham: Acumen, 2010.

Thomson, Iain. “From Heidegger and National Socialism.” In A Companion to

Heidegger. Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrath, 32-48. Oxford:

Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007.

Young, Julian. Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. United Kingdom: University Press, 1997.

[2] This quote deserves two citations, as it is was found in Richard Bessel’s Nazism and War on page 16, but was quoted within the book. Accordingly:

Ibid., 16.

Adolf Hitler, Basic Guidelines for the Reconstruction of the National Socialist German Workers Party, (Volkischer Beobachter: Düsseldorf, 1925), 105-107.

[3] Such as Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism author Julian Young

[4] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 1.

[5] Richard Polk, Being and Time, Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 70.

[6] Ibid., 70.

[7] Ibid., 72.

[8] Strambaugh, Being and Time, 17.

[9] Karl Lowith, The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (London: MIT Press, 1993), 173.

[10] Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings, ed. Manfred Stassen (New York: Continuum, 2003), 4.

[11] Ibid., 9.

[12] Martin Heidegger, Political Texts, 1933-1934, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (London: MIT Press, 1933), 40.

[13] Calvin, German Propaganda Archive, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/letzte.htm

[14] Heidegger, Political Texts, 40.

[15] Heidegger, Political Texts, 49.

[16] Ibid., 52.

[17] Martin Heidegger, interview by Der Spiegel, Der Spiegel, May 31, 1976.

[18] Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism, ed. Joseph Margolis and Paul Burrell (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 298.

[19] Ibid., 298.

[20] Iain Thomson, Heidegger and National Socialism, A Companion to Heidegger ed. Hubert Dreyfus, and Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 32.

C.S. Cowles writes a convincing essay on the christocentric hermeneutic and how one ought to understand genocide in the Old Testament. Those committed to Biblical inerrancy and infallibility of all Scripture must maintain a tension in the texts between the Old and New Testaments and will argue that the indiscriminate annihilation of the Canaanites was indeed willed by God. Since the annihilation accounts presents a story of “fanaticism, holy war, and wholesale sacrificial destruction (the herem),” Cowles claims that to attribute such atrocities to the actual intention and will of God poses insurmountable difficulties for Christian theology, ethics, and praxis.[i]

Most evangelicals justify the ethnic cleansing of Canaanites “on account of the wickedness of these nations” (Deut. 9:4) and propose that radical surgery was necessary in order to purify the land.[ii] John Calvin claims that God was pleased to purge the land of Canaan of the foul and loathsome defilements by which it had long been polluted.[iii] Cowles points out that Calvin admits that “indiscriminate and promiscuous slaughter (of the Canaanites), making no distinction of age or sex, including women and children, the aged and decrepit, might seem an inhuman massacre, had it not been executed by the command of God. Since God doomed certain nations to destruction, this puts an end to all discussion.[iv] The Bible says it, therefore, it’s true. Who are we to judge God’s character behind the genocidal commands? Inerrantists insist that for a human to judge the character of God behind and through the genocidal commands is inappropriate. The clay shall not talk back to its potter! However, I disagree with this simplistic objection because God also commands humans to use discernment and test the teachings we hear (John 7:24; Hebrews 5:13-14). To plug one’s head into the sand and merely accept the genocidal accounts on the presupposition that it’s the inerrant Word of God is intellectually dishonest, if not begging the question (i.e. circular reasoning).

To this popular view under the inerrantist umbrella, Cowles responds with a question, “what could possibly be just about the wanton and indiscriminate slaughter of women and children, the aged and the decrepit?” Insofar as Calvin’s theological presuppositions would allow no other conclusion, but that God had willed it from before the foundation of the world, he caught himself and acknowledged, “The decree is dreadful indeed.”[v] John Wesley claims that to attribute such atrocities to God is an outrage against his character and makes him “more false, more cruel, and more unjust than the devil.”[vi] According to Wesley and Cowles, genocidal commands make a mockery out of God’s justice, not to mention his holiness and love and poisons the well of His other attributes and overturns his justice, mercy, and truth.

According to John Bright, the Old Testament is a document of the faith of old Israel, and only secondarily a document of the church.[vii] I do not agree with Walter Brueggemann that the Old Testament is not a Christian message because I think the Old Testament points to the coming of Christ as the Messiah. However, I do think Cowles is correct in saying, “if we believe that Jesus is truly “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15), then we must resist all efforts to defend the Old Testament genocidal commands as reflective of the will and character of God. Since Jesus has come, we are under no obligation to justify that which cannot be justified, but can only be described as pre-Christ, sub-Christ, and anti-Christ”[viii]

Even though the genocidal texts are part of the Church canon, they cannot be dismissed since they tell about the history of Israel. Cowles nowhere claims that the Old Testament should be dismissed like Marconian thinking, however, in practice they must be viewed through a Christocentric view, which the church already does. Cowles is correct in that the mediators of God’s self-disclosure under the old covenant were telling the truth, as they understood it. “That their understanding of the “truth” may have been flawed is evident in the way the genocidal command was limited and in how it kept changing. The divine order to “completely destroy” applied only to the people inhabiting the land of Canaan and not cities that were at a distance (Deut. 20:10). The criteria for annihilating the one and not the other had nothing to do with moral or religious issues, but only that the former occupied the land the Israelites believed to be theirs.”[ix]

In addition, Cowles points out a notable point that “Johsua was not reprimanded for having directly contravened God’s clear command to “wipe out all (Canaanite) inhabitants” (Josh. 9:24), nor did Israel suffer battlefield defeats because of his disobedience. Achan perished for his sin and disobedience, but Joshua did not. It could be that God kept changing his mind about his genocidal will, but more likely, that Joshua’s perception of what God was telling him kept changing according to the exigencies of the moment.”[x] Cowles continues to state that the Israelites had no conception of Satan, which I disagree with because 1 Chronicles 21:1 attributes a sinful act to Satan. However, I do agree with Cowles that Moses and Joshua misunderstood the will and purposes of God in reference to Conquests.

The Old Testament is about Israel’s journey with God, including their examples of obedience, understanding of God, disobedience, and misunderstanding God. While Cowles does not dismiss the Old Testament entirely, he correctly notes that a radical shift in understanding God’s character and the sanctity of all human life occurred between the days of Joshua and Jesus. John Wesley, Jack Ford, and Earle Deasley point out in their commentary on Deuteronomy 7:1-2: “to apply these (genocidal) commands to warfare today would be a gross misapplication of Scripture. There can be no doubt that armed with the Christian Gospel and endued with the Holy Spirit, Paul would have entered Canaan as he entered Corinth to show God’s triumph over evil in transformed lives.”[xi]

If it is the case that Moses and Joshua misunderstood the will and purposes of God in conquests, Cowles then asks, “What parts of the Old Testament can we trust to reveal God’s will?” He states that “the question is moot if we ask the same of all who feel under no obligation to abide by Old Testament laws governing Sabbath worship, ritual circumcision, animal sacrifices, eating pork, capital punishment for adulterers and those who pick up sticks on the Sabbath. If Bible-believing Christians are asked how they can justify setting aside great blocks of divine commands in the Old Testament as “truth for today,” even the most avowed scriptural literalist will respond “because we are no longer living under the old covenant but the new.” Exactly! Says Cowles.”[xii]

Cowles is asking that evangelicals extend their Christological principles of biblical interpretation to cover all texts of violence that are incompatible with the nature of God as disclosed in Jesus. This is because final authority in matters of faith, salvation, and the nature of God is Jesus. Since Jesus never endorsed genocide and rebuked disciples for entertaining calling fire down from heaven to destroy a certain group (Luke 9:55) of people who would not let them lodge in Samaritan territory (Luke 9:51-56). Cowles correctly notes that God does not need to proactively judge sinners because whoever does not believe stands condemned already. This is the verdict: Light has come into the world, but men loved darkness instead of light because their deeds were evil (John 3:18-19).

Furthermore, “Jesus never used his supernatural miracle-working power to hurt, maim, conquer, or destroy. He was the embodiment of God’s servant. The God revealed in and through Jesus is not one who summons his “warriors to carry out his wrath (Isa. 13:3); much less does he will the indiscriminate genocidal annihilation of any peoples or nations. It is not “holy warriors” who will not be called “Sons of God,” but the peacemakers (Matt. 5:9). If our God is Christ-like, then we can categorically affirm that God is not a destroyer. Death was not a part of God’s original Creation, neither will there be any more “death and mourning or crying or pain in the new (Rev. 21:4). God does not engage in punitive, redemptive, or sacred violence. Violence and death are the intrinsic consequences of violating God’s created order; they are the work of Satan, for he was a “murderer from the beginning” (John 8:44). God does not proactively use death as an instrument of judgment in that death is an enemy, the “last enemy” to be destroyed by Christ (1 Cor. 15:20-28).”[xiii]

[ii] Ilbid, 17.

[iii] John Calvin. Commentaries on the Book of Joshua), 97

[iv] Ilbid.

[v] John Calvin. Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford

Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 3.23.7 (pp. 955-56).

[vi] John Wesley, “Free Grace,” in The Works of John Wesley (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1872; repr. Kansas City: Nazarine Publishing House, n.d.), 7:373-86

[vii] John Bright, The Authority of the Old Testament, 183.

[viii] John Cowles, Show Them No Mercy: 4 Views on God and Canaanite Genocide, 36.

[ix] Ilbid, 40.

[x] Ilbid, 40

[xi] Jack Ford and A.R.G. Deasley, Beacon Bible Commentary (Kansas City. Beacon Hill, 1969), 539-40.

[xii] John Cowles. Show Them No Mercy: 4 Views on God and Canaanite Genocide, 41.

[xiii] Ilbid, 29

1) Churches function very much like secular corporations in the sense that you are valuable to the church community if you have much to offer. If you have little or nothing to contribute to the community, you will be largely ignored. Indeed, individuals apply a consumeristic paradigm to their church experience and the church returns the favor by treating its members as commodities or liabilities much like a corporation.

2) If you are a women, you are limited in what you can do in ministry based on your gender, not on your gifts, talents, and passions. In fact, if you are a woman with an advanced degree in theology/ministry, you will still be ignored while the male with little to no training is invested in and raised up in leadership. If you are a male with theological training, the church begs you to teach, preach, and lead ministries. However, if you are a woman, they expect you to be a follower, take care of children, be a greeter at the door, take on the tasks that men think are “feminine,” and go to a Beth Moore Bible study. The Beth Moore “study” does not teach women how to think, interpret Scripture, learn about theology, or critical thinking. It is anti-intellectual, sensationalist “study.” I think it is time for women to break out some theology, philosophy, and Biblical studies texts instead. Oh wait, the intellectually challenging material are for the mens bible study. Just go to the website of most churches and you will see that the men’s Bible studies teach substantive topics, while women merely engage in sensationalist “Bible studies.” At the end of the day, I would like to see some gifted women I know with strong pastoral gifts and who can uphold Christian character very well be lifted up and supported as ministry leaders beyond the following: just being a deacon, child care worker, or women’s Bible study leader. Moreover, I would like to see women laity engage in more intellectually edifying studies on the Bible and theology.

Personally, I have lost heart for the church and no longer desire to serve in ministry leadership. In fact, I readily admit that I cannot live up to the morality standards of church/ministry leadership, so I will not pursue this avenue. Instead, I hope to write, help those in need, encourage the disheartened, challenge the status quo, help others think critically, assist others in discovering their gifts and passions, and challenge common stereotypes/generalizations/misconceptions of who Jesus is and what He stands for.

3) Churches create a superficial environment where you meet and greet others for a few minutes, proceed through the service, and then leave. It seems like people come to church to: 1) engage with God, 2) desire to be known, and 3) desire to know others. However, I’m not sure how people can be known and know others in the mechanical, superficial, political, hierarchical structure we call the American church. To foster community, there might be some small groups, but very few actually go to these. I think this is a cultural problem given consumerism, perpetual “busyness,” and the tendency towards constant diversion in order to avoid one’s mortality, thoughts, and feelings. Perhaps church needs to be a gathering in a home where people share meals, stories, prayer, sing songs, and share resources with one another like the first century church. This may be the best way for people to connect with God, themselves, and others. I realize there is no easy answer and no church could ever be “perfect” on this side of eternity.

Of course, relationships in any context are challenging, but I hope and pray that the church will at least strive to adopt and actually implement a servant leadership model. This means: 1) raising people in the congregation up (both male and female), 2) Helping people realize their gifts, talents, and passions if they do not know these already, 3) empowering others in the church community to take on some form of leadership and empower others in return, and 4) actively serving the local and international community in some way. Most churches do a lot of talking about serving the local community, but many do not.

4) Many believers (and non-believers) cut ties with those who do not agree with them on all or most core beliefs. While humanity’s track record is poor when it comes to negotiating relationships with those who differ in beliefs, I think Christians should be held to a higher standard and not sever relationships with those who do not align with all or most of their beliefs.

I hope that my words do not come across as merely a rant, but rather a thoughtful challenge to the American church.

“The Test in the Supposed Garden of Eden Was a Sham”
By John W. Loftus at 3/12/2010
If under the same initial test conditions in the supposed Garden of Eden every human being would fail that test, then either, 1) God created us faulty in some way, or 2) The test was a sham. And since a fair test would mean some of us would not have sinned, then some human beings are being punished in this world for something they never would have done in the first place. This is just one of many problems that keeps me from believing.”
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Even though I’m not an evangelical Christian, I think many evangelicals would claim that the garden scenario was not a test, thus this dichotomy does not apply. Instead, the Garden of Eden presents a situation in which humans exercise their freewill. As a result, Adam and Eve end up distancing themselves from God through disobedience, however, God allows for restoration through Christ.

What is my personal response? Since I believe in theistic evolution, I do not believe that Adam & Eve or the Garden scenario existed in a literal sense. While I do believe in God, including Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection, it is not necessary that I believe in the garden scenario or original sin to accept Christ. Then why did Christ die? To not only provide justice for human rebellion, but to participate in human existence; with all its suffering and joy. This forever altered how humans interact and commune with God. Christ’s life example, teachings, death, and resurrection provide the way for all humanity to connect with God and live out the life-giving ways of Christ. Essentially, it is not imperative that one accept a literal Adam & Eve garden story to be a follower of Christ.

While I do not agree with the level of historical skepticism or the level of demythologization of Bultmann, I think he is correct that sin abounds in the human refusal to accept the gift of authentic existence. “The significance of Jesus is not to be found in his supposed placating of a wrathful God, but in the fact that through him ‘our authentic life becomes a possibility in fact for us only when we are freed from ourselves.’” In particular, I appreciate Bultmann’s point that each person experiences judgment not in the afterlife or during some future cataclysmic event, but in each moment, as he or she chooses to reject or accept the call of God.

It appears to me that most atheists/agnostics/skeptics present the false dichotomy of either evangelical Christianity or atheism/agnosticism/skepticism. I do not think that one should reject the central message of Christianity merely because one does not affiliate with a fundamentalist/evangelical paradigm.

Tuesday, March 16th at 7:30 pm in Old Main Chapel.

Speaker: Wes Morriston, Professor, Philosophy Dept., UCB. Title: “Divinely Mandated Genocide in the Bible: Is God bad? Or is the Bible wrong about God?”Abstract: Many people believe both that God is perfectly good and that the Bible contains an accurate portrait of God’s character and behavior. I will argue that this combination of views cannot be sustained in the face of biblical texts that represent God as having commanded genocidal warfare.

ADVICE ON WRITING PHILOSOPHY ESSAY

What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Preface to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Being profound and seeming profound. – Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science III.173

We all have a tendency to think that the world must conform to our prejudices. The opposite view involves some effort of thought, and most people would die sooner than think – in fact, they do so.
Bertrand Russell

The greatest souls are capable of the greatest vices as well as the greatest virtues; and those who proceed but very slowly can make much greater progress, if they always follow the right path, than those who hurry and stray from it.
René Descartes, Discourse on the Method

A. Pay careful attention to the questions asked. They are usually asked the way they are asked for a reason.

B. Do not place high priority on writing a smooth essay; that is, an essay that gives the impression that you see no difficulties in the subject. At least if you see difficulties, don’t try just to get around them. On the contrary, try to articulate the difficulties. Putting difficulties explicitly in what you write is one of the best possible ways to learn — especially because it puts pressure on you to resolve the difficulties. As I see it, there is no comparison between a difficulty ignored or glossed over or missed on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a difficulty that is articulated clearly — or failing that even not too clearly. This is true whether or not you can think of a successful solution. And it is true even if you can think of a solution one might think would work, though you can show that it won’t. (If the professor is doing his job, he won’t miss the difficulty even if you gloss over it: the only thing is, you will have missed the opportunity to articulate and learn from the difficulty in the best possible way, namely by starting on it from where you yourself are at.)

C. In examining the writings of a particular philosopher, be hard on him or her. If what they say seems wrong, say so, and say WHY you think they’re wrong. But don’t merely leave the matter there. Make that a challenge to see how the philosopher might have responded to your challenge. So construct as sympathetic a response as you can to your own objection. (But don’t leave it there: be hard on this sympathetic response. Then construct as sympathetic a response…, and so on as long as it proves profitable.) As you will discover by experience, this procedure is the most likely to yield philosophically and exegetically convincing readings of what a philosopher believes.

D. Do not place a high priority on writing something just because you think that is what I think. In general, I tend to see through this. If it is grades you are worried about, you’re much more likely to do well in this course by disagreeing with me rather than by agreeing with me. (But of course what is important is how you argue for your positions). Also, you tend to learn more if you disagree, provided of course that it is genuine disagreement and not just the old ‘dig in the heels’ routine. Most of all, just try to be straight with me about what you think and what your difficulties and objections are. That’s the best way to learn.

E. Motivate the positions of the philosophers you are interpreting. If an actor crosses the stage at certain point without conveying a motive to the audience, but merely because the director told him or her to make such a cross, the audience is mystified, and the play is on its way to ruin. If I want to know what a certain stone-age people believe and you tell me that they think a certain stone is god, I will have learned nothing from you until I have got some idea of just HOW they can believe such a thing. And such an idea I cannot get till I have some idea what reasons they have for thinking this particular stone so different from other stones. Unless the beliefs of the stone-age people in question have been motivated, to tell me they believe a god is a stone is to just play at the study of primitive religion. The philosophers you are studying with us are in general worth studying. They usually have something in mind when they say something. If what they say sounds queer, then that is not just an ultimate fact you can just report. You need to try to figure out for yourself (and for us) just how — starting from something that is halfway reasonable in the circumstances — the philosophers should have got to the queer-looking position they ended up with. (It goes without saying that the same sorts of remarks apply to the study of primitive religions).

F. Don’t write for me — knowing what I know, believing what I do. (‘Oh, Tony knows that stuff, I don’t need to explain it to him.) Instead write for an intelligent person with no specialist background. Write for yourself two years down the road. Make sure your ideas are well enough explained that if you pick up the essay two years hence without having done any philosophy interim, you will still be able to understand what you were saying in your essay. Don’t write in a PRIVATE CODE of your own or a private code that you think someone in this class (or the professor) will understand. If an intelligent student, not in this class but with some interest in the subject, reads your essay, they should be able to understand the issues you are discussing and where you stand on those issues.

G. Don’t forget to NUMBER your pages and DOCUMENT your sources or references.

H. You should also single-space any quotation that is more than three lines long.

1. ALL-OR-NOTHING THINKING: You see things in black and white categories. If
your performance falls short of perfect, you see yourself as a total failure.

2. OVERGENERALIZATION: You see a single negative event as a never-ending
pattern of defeat.

3. MENTAL FILTER: You pick out a single negative detail and dwell on it exclusively
so that your vision of all reality becomes darkened, like the drop of ink that discolors
the entire beaker of water.

4. DISQUALIFYING THE POSITIVE: You reject positive experiences by insisting
they “don’t count” for some reason or other. In this way you can maintain a negative
belief that is contradicted by your everyday experiences.

5. JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS: You make a negative interpretation even though
there are no definite facts that convincingly support your conclusions.
a. Mind Reading. You arbitrarily conclude that someone is reacting negatively
to you, and you don’t bother to check this out.
b. The FortuneTeller Error. You anticipate that things will turn out badly, and
you feel convinced that your prediction is an already established fact.

6. MAGNIFICATION (CATASTROPHIZING) OR MINIMIZATION: You exaggerate
the importance of things (such as your goof-up or someone else’s achievement). Or
you inappropriately shrink things until they appear tiny (your own desirable qualities
or the other fellow’s imperfections). This is also called the “binocular trick.”

7. EMOTIONAL REASONING: You assume that your negative emotions necessarily
reflect the way things really are: “I feel it, therefore it must be true.”

8. SHOULD STATEMENTS: You try to motivate yourself with shoulds and shouldn’ts,
as if you had to be whipped and punished before you could be expected to do
anything. “Musts” and “oughts” are also offenders. The emotional consequence is
guilt. When you direct should statements toward others, you feel anger, frustration,
and resentment.

9. LABELING AND MISLABELING: This is an extreme form of over-generalization.
Instead of describing your error, you attach a negative label to yourself: “I’m a loser.”
When someone else’s behavior rubs you the wrong way, you attach a negative label
to him: “He’s a damn louse.” Mislabeling involves describing an event with language
that is highly colored and emotionally loaded.

10. PERSONALIZATION: You see yourself as the cause of some negative event which
in fact you were not primarily responsible for.

[From:Burns, David D. Feeling Good. Morrow, 1980]